

VOL. VIII.

JUNE, 1927

No. 1

CALEB PERRY PATTERSON

GEORGE WARD STOCKING

MAX SYLVIE HANDMAN

FACET

SIGNIFICANT TENDENCIES IN EUROPEAN SOCIETY	
. CALLED FRANK PATTERSON	1
THE MEXICAN VAGUERS OF THE TEXAS BORDER - J. FRANK DORR	15
THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF RUSSIA	
. PHILIP G. MORRIS	27
NEW COTTON AREAS FOR OLD A. E. COE	49
THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE REPORT ON IMPERIAL RELATIONS	
. ROBERT A. MACKEY	61
INDUCTIVE VS. DEDUCTIVE METHOD IN SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH	
. C. M. FERRY	68
RECENT CHANGES IN THE TEXAS BANKING SYSTEM	
. FREDRAY WEAVER	75
BOOK REVIEWS Edited by O. DONALD WHEAT	88

"Entered as second-class matter January 10, 1921, at the Postoffice at Austin, Texas, under the Act of March 3, 1879."

The Southwestern Political and Social Science Association

PRESIDENT

ELMER SCOTT, Dallas, Texas

FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT

GEORGE B. DEALY, Dallas, Texas

SECOND VICE-PRESIDENT

D. Y. THOMAS, Fayetteville, Arkansas

THIRD VICE-PRESIDENT

S. L. HORNBEAK, Waxahachie, Texas

SECRETARY-TREASURER

CAMPBELL B. BEARD, Austin, Texas

EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

PRESIDENT, ELMER SCOTT, Dallas, Texas

EX-PRESIDENT, J. G. WILLACY, San Antonio, Texas

EX-PRESIDENT, W. B. BIZZELL, Norman, Oklahoma

EX-PRESIDENT, W. M. W. SPLAWN, Austin, Texas

EX-PRESIDENT A. P. WOOLDRIDGE, Austin, Texas

EX-PRESIDENT GEORGE VAUGHAN, Little Rock, Arkansas

EX-PRESIDENT H. G. JAMES, Lincoln, Nebraska

VICE-PRESIDENT GEORGE B. DEALY, Dallas, Texas

VICE-PRESIDENT D. Y. THOMAS, Fayetteville, Arkansas

VICE-PRESIDENT S. L. HORNBEAK, Waxahachie, Texas

THE BOARD OF EDITORS

SECRETARY-TREASURER, Campbell B. Beard, Austin, Texas

ELECTED MEMBERS

{ CHAS. W. PIPKIN, Baton Rouge, Louisiana
{ W. F. HAUHAET, Dallas, Texas.

THE SOUTHWESTERN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY is supplied to all members of the Southwestern Political and Social Science Association. The subscription price of the QUARTERLY is three dollars a year. Applications for membership, orders for the QUARTERLY and remittances should be addressed to Campbell B. Beard, Secretary-Treasurer of the Association, University Station, Austin, Texas.

Correspondence with reference to contributions to the QUARTERLY should be addressed to the Board of Editors, University Station, Austin, Texas.

THE SOUTHWESTERN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

*The editors disclaim responsibility for views expressed by contributors
to THE QUARTERLY*

Vol. VIII.

June, 1927

No. 1

SIGNIFICANT TENDENCIES IN EUROPEAN SOCIETY

BY CALEB PERRY PATTERSON

University of Texas

It is clear to students of society and its institutions that the world is in a transition period of an unusual character. Students of the social sciences know that *change is the law of society*. It is also true that more or less natural or revolutionary tendencies are by virtue of our highly organized society frequently given an accelerated motion by being sponsored by organizations and as a result changes are made before experience dictates modification. It is apparent that European society is more thoroughly disorganized than it has been since the barbarian invasions of the Roman Empire. This situation makes Europe a very inviting field for the adventurer, the opportunist, and the experimenter, and it is obvious that they are utilizing their opportunities.

Are the phenomena of this society simply anarchistic or may they be said to have rather definite movement and direction? What are these activities and their significance? Among these manifestations or tendencies may be mentioned the following:

I. ORGANIZED INTERNATIONAL COÖPERATION

The reasons for this tendency are numerous. Europe is beginning to see that the supremacy of the white man's civilization or western civilization is threatened. Europe rightfully regards herself as the creator of this civilization and its

leader. She wants to maintain this leadership. She does not believe that she can do this by her former nationalistic, antagonistic, and militaristic method. She is impressed with the fact that the Great War was the first event in human history in which every race, nation, caste, political and economic order was concerned. *This is the discovery of international interdependence.* "Henceforth, therefore, statesmanship," says Ramsay Muir, "no longer has to do only with European politics, which cannot now be isolated from world-politics. Nevertheless, Europe is still, and more fully than ever, the center of civilization; for it is through their relations with the Greater European states that the extra-European peoples, whether of European or of non-European origin, are linked with one another and brought within a single system. Europe is still the main source of the political ideas or methods of organization which all the world is imitating, and of the science which has transformed, and is transforming, the conditions of human life. Though western civilization has found new homes and strongholds in the Americas and elsewhere, it is still mainly upon old Europe that the fate of that civilization depends."

Europe realizes that her past record of perennial discord is largely responsible for the revolt of non-European races against her leadership. To the Asiatic and African peoples, the main enterprise of western civilization seems to be war and war unto death. This type of civilization does not make a very strong appeal to peoples who are natural pacifists. What is the use of changing to a civilization that is rapidly exploiting itself to destruction. A civilization, engrossed with jealousies and class strife, spending its substance on armaments, and permitting its institutions to disintegrate and many of its people to suffer, cannot present itself as a model for imitation. Western civilization faces the spectacle of one of its greatest peoples—the Russians—deliberately proposing to destroy it by violence, at least the foundation of its present form. The West is still on probation and must solve the problem of peace among its national groups as well as within these groups—international peace and peace between classes. Europe realizes that her behavior for the next few years is very vital

to itself and humanity. Can western civilization work on a coöperative basis?

There is a growing feeling in Europe that the treaty of Versailles is more vicious in its provisions than the treaty of Vienna. It is now clear to liberal French statesmen, and apparently to Poincaré, that France is even more the victim of the treaty of Versailles than Germany. This treaty must be modified. It *will* be modified by either pacific or violent methods. Europe believes it is wiser for this reconstruction to be done by the round table process. Great Britain is primarily interested in peace on the continent for at least two reasons. She recognizes that her policy of isolation is no longer possible. She must participate in what takes place on the continent, whether it be war or peace. She is not financially able to participate in war. She has almost a civil war in her social order at home. Again, she has nothing to gain or lose by any readjustments that might be made on the continent; hence, she prefers pacific methods. All of the political parties in Great Britain favor using the League machinery or agreements worked out in harmony with the covenant and administered by the League or arbitral bodies. They favor organized international coöperation. The Liberal and Labor parties favor the use of the League exclusively.

France is convinced that coöperation is her best gamble. The foreign policy of M. Heriot and M. Briand has triumphed. Poincaré's policy has been repudiated. France sees that Germany was not destroyed by the war—not even by the treaty of Versailles. She knows that she cannot contend successfully with Germany on the battlefield. She is practically a bankrupt. She is not a commercial power of the first class. Her civil service is packed with twice as many people as are needed—merely as a means of pensioning war veterans. Her only hope is disarmament, rigid national economy, and coöperation.

Germany has most to gain by the process of readjustment. She is disarmed, debt-burdened, and trying a new political order. In fact, Germany is initiating some of the movements of coöperation in European politics. She is the originator of the diplomacy that ended in the Locarno Agreements. The spirit of Locarno by virtue of her admission to the League

has been transferred to Geneva. The League pledged itself to a program of reconstruction to induce her to join it. She does not expect any sudden or radical changes to be made; her statesmen speak of "evolution by coöperation."

Italy is also friendly to organized international coöperation. She joined Great Britain to guarantee the security pact of Locarno fame. Facism believes that Italy should participate in League activities as the head of an organization of smaller states to check the influence of Great Britain and France. Facism means to coöperate with the League for its own selfish purposes. What is also encouraging is that the opposition parties to Facism, the Socialists and the Catholics, which are the popular parties in Italy, favor working through the League. They have been inclined to regard the League as a promise, but they now see it as the formulating agent of the foreign policy of Europe. Evidently Facism does not want to incur the ill will of the powers in the League because it will be difficult for any government in Europe to stand that opposes the League. It is equally true that the opposition parties in Italy believe that the League is a check upon the reactionary regime of Mussolini.

Coöperation has made considerable progress among the newer and smaller states of Europe. The "Little Entente" of 1920, which was at first an anti-Hungarian organization since it guaranteed the possessions of three of the "Successor-States" acquired at the expense of Hungary, has been reconstructed into a pacific organization by its main purpose being incorporated in the Hungarian Reconstruction Protocols of 1924, which placed the problem of maintaining the existing frontiers of these powers under the auspices of the League and in this respect served as the model of the Locarno Agreements. This scheme of regional agreements among the powers most concerned providing for arbitral and judicial settlement of all disputes arising under such compacts bids fair to fill the gaps in the covenant of the League and thus lay the foundations of a constitutional order of law and peace.

Practically all political parties in Europe favor organized international coöperation. The Liberal and Labor parties of Great Britain are insistent that all regional agreements be in line with the covenant of the League and be administered

by League machinery. The present government of Great Britain has been suspected of not using the League as extensively as it might. Lloyd George, Lord Oxford, Sir John Simon, and Ramsay McDonald quizzed Austin Chamberlain very critically about his conduct at Geneva last March. Liberal opinion in Great Britain was a very strong factor in the establishment of the League. The Baldwin government has not dared to refuse support to the League. The parties of Italy, France, and Germany except the Communists are squarely behind the League. The fact that the League is such a strong political factor in practically all the nations of western and central Europe is indicative of the grip it has upon the life of these people.

Again, Europe feels a helplessness or weakness that it never experienced before. Coöperation is usually not a matter of choice but of necessity. Undoubtedly it is a feeling of self-sufficiency on the part of the United States that is responsible for our indifference toward international coöperation. Great Britain has lost her commercial supremacy, her naval supremacy, and her imperial control over the Dominions, India, Ireland, and Egypt. She is heavily burdened with debt and internecine class struggle. Great Britain is the driving force behind the European *entente*. France, Germany, and Italy are practically financial bankrupts. Europe is really under the financial suzerainty of the United States. It is as Caillaux has said, "unite or die." For Europe the choice is between a program of coöperation and that of the Third Internationale. In other words there is no choice. How can the twenty-six states of Europe compete individually with such economic units as the British Empire, United States, and potential Russia and China?

It is not without significance that the medieval theory of state sovereignty has broken down in Europe. It does not square with the facts of European life. It is the chief defect in the present theory of international law. Overseas trade and communication, international trade and finance, international exchange and division of labor demonstrate the economic insufficiency of the modern state. Economic interdependence is forcing the abandonment of outworn political

concepts and the reconstruction or the establishment of political machinery that can function in the interest of society. The acceptance of this tendency is a material factor in the development of the spirit of coöperation in Europe.

It must by no means be understood that organized international coöperation is restricted to the bureaus and activities of the League despite the fact that its activities touch almost every phase of human society. There are more than forty international organizations with headquarters at Geneva. There are the Universal Postal Union at Berne, the Institute of Agriculture at Rome, the International Bureau of Hygiene, the Bureau of Intellectual Coöperation, and the International Bureau of Weights and Measures at Paris, and the courts of Arbitration and International Justice at The Hague, to mention only a few of the outstanding international agencies. There are boards, commissions, societies, and congresses by the hundreds that are seeking to eliminate friction and waste from modern life.

II. THE BREAKDOWN OF PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT

"Every traveller," said James Bryce in 1921, "who, curious in political affairs, enquires in the countries which he visits how their legislative bodies are working, receives from the elder men the same discouraging answer. They tell him, in terms much the same everywhere, that there is less brilliant speaking than in the days of their own youth, that the tone of manners has declined, that the best citizens are less disposed to enter the Chamber, that its proceedings are less fully reported and excite less interest, that a seat in it confers less social status, and that, for one reason or another, the respect felt for it has waned."

"Does the epoch since 1919," asks Harold J. Laski, "mean that the habits of parliamentary government are, in fact, suited only to a small part of Western civilization? Are those habits already obsolete, and the present period the birth pangs of a new method of political arrangement? Is it true—as, for instance, the Russian theorists, on the one hand, and Mussolini, on the other, seem to claim—that concepts like liberty, consent, constitutionalism, democracy, represent merely a

phase of historic evolution and the moment for their eclipse has already arrived"

What do the dictatorships of Spain, Italy, Greece, Russia, Poland, Lithuania mean? What is the significance of the strong man—Poincaré—in France? What is the justification of His Majesty's Government in Great Britain permitting a coal strike to cost the nation millions of pounds without a permanent solution of the problem and the probability existing that the same situation will arise again? Has there been more than the mere shadow of parliamentary government in Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, Jugoslavia, and Finland since the war? What will happen in Germany where the Socialists have defeated the government.

An examination of a few of these illustrations will suffice to show the extent to which this tendency is prevalent. By parliamentary government is meant representative government by means of political parties—a party of the government and a party of the opposition or groups associated so as to form a government and an opposition. The party of the government works by means of a committee of its leaders known as a cabinet and the opposition has a similar committee of leaders. When the cabinet as a committee of the majority party has become so strong that it can practically ignore the body of which it is a mere committee—when the part becomes superior to the whole, can one not raise the question as to whether this is parliamentary government? Is this government by representatives or by a little oligarchy? In Great Britain, the cabinet no longer resigns when it is defeated by the House of Commons. It dissolves the House of Commons and appeals over its head to the voters. If it is sustained by the ballot box, it remains in power; if not, then it resigns.

The cabinet has the advantage in such a contest. In the first place, the House of Commons does not like to be dissolved because its members don't know that they will be re-elected to their seats. In the second place, elections are expensive and are a test of physical endurance. In the third place, the cabinet can prepare a national psychology favorable to its position. The result of this situation is that the House of Commons practically lets the cabinet have its way and thus abdicates its function of control. It is obvious, of course, that

the reason the cabinet has adopted the practice of appealing to the voters is that it has discovered that it is easier to stay in power by popular consent than by the will of the House of Commons. Some students of government call this a more direct democracy. Suppose you do call it that, is it parliamentary government? May it not also be called government by *plebescite*? In the day of Napoleon I and Napoleon III, France had government by *plebescite*. Who has ever thought of calling that system direct democracy? The point is that even in Great Britain, the birthplace of parliamentary government, there are tendencies away from representative government in the direction of a stronger executive type. The executive in Great Britain by means of orders in council exercises legislative power. It also controls the budget; the House of Commons has not changed an item in the budget for more than forty years. It also practically exercises the treaty-making power. It likewise controls the patronage of the government and the honors conferred by it. "In Britain also," said James Bryce, "the legislature, or rather, the House of Commons, is legally supreme, but in practice it is much controlled by the cabinet, who can dissolve it, and can appeal to the party organizations over the country to require members to render steady support. Though, as Bagebot observed, as a committee of Parliament, they are a *Ruling Committee*."

In Italy parliamentary government has been set aside a little less ceremoniously. Mussolini with his private army simply took over the kingdom and had himself made premier, presumably for life as he is responsible only to the King who will certainly not dismiss him, and his army legalized as a national militia. He now holds the seven portfolios of Foreign Affairs, War, Navy, the Air, Interior, Colonies, and Finance. The following brief summary of recent legislation indicates the extent of reorganization of the Italian government by Facism:

1. Extension of the power of the Premier (a) by making him responsible to the King and the ministers responsible to him; thereby giving him the absolute power of dissolution of parliament without affecting his own position; (b) by giving him the power of legislative decree; (c) by giving him the power of appointment and dismissal of all under-secretaries;

(d) by legalizing him as the head of the significant departments of Foreign Affairs, War, Navy, Air, Interior, Colonies, and Finance with under-secretaries in these departments to do his bidding; (e) by making him secretary of the Supreme Order of Annunziata; (f) by giving him complete control of the agenda of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies; (g) by giving him a yearly honarium fixed by royal decree, which, of course, is his own decree approved by a titular King; and (h) by making his person inviolate. Hence, he is no longer *primus inter pares*, but the absolute head of the government. He is the *substance* of the government; the rest of the machinery is *form*.

2. The power of the central government over local government has been increased; (a) by increasing the powers of the prefects who are appointed by the premier; (b) by substituting an appointed mayor or Podesta with an appointed council over the communes which enjoyed until 1926 the right of electing the syndic or mayor. By royal decree this change may apply to larger towns.

3. Special government for Rome—the capital of the kingdom—which consists of a governor, two vice-governors, ten rectors, and an advisory council of eighty members, all appointed by royal decree. This gives the premier complete control of the government of Rome.

4. All organizations, associations, and institutions operating within the Kingdom are placed under rigid supervision by the central government which may revoke their charters, fine and imprison their members if its wishes are disrespected.

5. Every newspaper must appoint a director who becomes responsible for the contents of the paper. This director must be a registered journalist and obtain the sanction of the State's Attorney of the Court of Appeals in whose jurisdiction the paper is published. The State's Attorney may deny or revoke his sanction as the circumstances in his opinion require.

6. All disputes between capital and labor are settled by compulsory arbitration, the arbiters being appointed by the central government.

The French government is the most truly parliamentary government in Europe because the representatives or deputies

play a more dominant part in the workings of their system. This is due to the group party system, to the committee system of the Chamber of Deputies, and to the fact that there is practically no dissolution in the French system. When a French cabinet is defeated, it resigns because there can be no dissolution without the Senate's consent which it never gives; hence there is no opportunity for a French cabinet to appeal to the voters. While this is more truly parliamentary government than the English system, it is a weaker and less satisfactory government because it lacks leadership. There is no place for leadership in it. The French Deputies refuse to be led as the English Commoners. There have been more than a dozen cabinets in France since the Armistice. In fact, this makes it possible for France to have at the present time a cabinet composed primarily of ex-premiers. It is difficult to see how a nation can go forward under such leaderless direction. This is the attitude of a great many Frenchmen who want a stronger President.

In Spain, there is practically the same situation as exists in Italy. A military hero, Primo de Rivera, is ruling Spain under a titular King, preserving only the forms of constitutionalism. Russia, of course, has a military dictatorship, yet, in fact she never had parliamentary government. The German experiment is too recent for an authoritative opinion to be expressed, yet there are the elements of a dictatorship present. President Hindenburg, the fetish of modern Germany, is a military hero with an army of 100,000 of the old order at his command, and he may be forced to execute a *coup d'état* to save Germany from socialism. Greece has a military dictatorship and the new states of Central and Southeastern Europe have centralized systems of government with strong armies, expecting war from each other, or from Russia or Germany over boundary disputes or minority problems.

What are the causes of this tendency away from representative government? Among the more significant factors may be enumerated the following:

1. There is a general trend toward stronger executives throughout the world, as true in the United States as in Europe, due largely to the technical character of western civilization, which representative bodies composed of laymen do

not understand and hence cannot intelligently legislate for. This is forcing legislative bodies to grant the initiative to administrative officials and to restrict their own activities to approving or rejecting. Also, industrial organization is having its influence upon political organization.

2. The Great War tremendously strengthened this tendency. Practically all governments became autocracies during the war. In Great Britain, the regular cabinet and Parliament were dismissed, and Lloyd George, the Prime Minister, with a war cabinet of six members responsible only to him with a large secretariate took over the functions of the government. This was more or less the common formula that all governments which participated in the war assumed because efficiency and expedition demanded it. The effect of this experience will in some measure be permanent because it represented a dominant tendency and because there is never a complete restoration.

3. Constitutionalism is relatively a recent phenomenon. Central Europe, Southeastern Europe, Turkey, and Russia have never practiced it in the true sense of the term. France has made more constitutions than any other power. Spain has had more different governments in the last century than any other European state. Portugal has been revolutionary. In fact, the western world has been trained to use force. Why compromise and play with legislatures and ballot boxes, when it is so easy to secure by force what you want?

4. Still the uncertainty of peace is felt throughout Europe. Anyone familiar with the history of Europe can appreciate the difficulty it would experience in trying to persuade itself that peace is secure. The result of this psychology is that there are a million or more men under arms in Europe today than before the war. The injustices of the treaties of 1919 are largely responsible for this feeling. Hence, *power* is the major consideration with all governments in Europe. Representative government is peculiarly a product of times of peace.

5. The excesses of socialism is a strong factor in this situation. The Labor parties of Europe have been too conciliatory toward Communism to please national feeling. The leaders of the strike in Great Britain boldly advocated the overthrow of the government, and a social revolution. Members of the

Labor Party championed their cause on the floor of the House of Commons. Facism in Italy claims the credit for preventing a social revolution. It is, of course, common knowledge that the Third Internationale under the auspices of the Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Government is seeking to overthrow society. It is natural that resistance to this movement would take the form of strong governments and dictatorships, yet it is possible that such governments in their suppression of freedom of thought, speech, the press, and liberty in general will play into the hands of their enemies.

6. The new nationalism of many portions of Europe with its militaristic and protectionist features aggravated by minority problems is not a pacific agency. If in these new states federalism had been adopted, adequate expression for minorities as in Switzerland could have been provided, but this was not what the majority group wanted. Hence, the denationalization of minorities by force is being attempted in some instances. It is natural for a hodge-podge nation like Poland to be in a state of constant fear of disintegration.

There are at least three conditions necessary for the restoration of representative government in Europe: (1) *International peace*. Nationalism must be readjusted to a new internationalism. This is the most important and a prerequisite.

(2) *Economic Revival*. Europe must recover financially and along with this recovery the abyss between the rich and the poor must be bridged. The challenge of socialism and communism must be met by a deliberate innovation or by force.

(3) *The readjustment of representative institutions to harmonize with a new social order and the requirements of international coöperation*. These conditions should be faced courageously and steps toward their solution taken in time to meet the exigencies of the situation. The hopeful sign is that European statesmanship is facing the facts and progress is being made.

III. THE BEARING OF THE NEW INDUSTRIALISM

The new industrial revolution which is doing much to revive and unify Europe was greatly accelerated by the scientific

progress forced by the war. Huge projects of electrification in Switzerland, Italy, and France, new methods of transportation in the air, by land, and in the sea, and wireless communication are producing as great departures in human life as the industrial changes of the nineteenth century inaugurated. Will the new revolution tend to distribute population, beautify the country, and give contentment to rural life? Will it eliminate the hostility between urban and rural populations created by the old revolution? Will it give comforts and mental alertness to rural life that have heretofore been restricted to urban centers? Will it promote peace? It has made possible a world credit which may enable a few men to control the world because it works under cover. Practically all scientific innovations in the fields of transportation and communication facilitate international coöperation both economically and politically. When the Council of the League can call its members together though the air as it has done, there seems to be little reason for international isolation as a European proposition.

IV. A TURNING FROM MATERIALISM

Europe is placing less emphasis on the materialistic and more on the intellectual and philosophical. Europe is beginning to see a decline in the game of exploitation of natural resources. She has been training for this for the past century. Specialization of studies and of functions has been the program. Technicians have been produced in every field of activity—specialists—but practically nothing has been done to prepare diagnosticians of society. The philosophical studies have been neglected because they have been considered unrelated to industry. What does the chemist, the physicist, the engineer, the mathematician, the banker, the merchant, and the advertiser need with the philosophical studies? Result is we have been preparing people to do things, but we have not been preparing directors of society. We have learned how to do the little things connected with our special interest, but we have not learned to survey the movements of civilization as a whole as a means of discovering the ills of society and its in-

stitutions and of pointing the way to a healthy social and political order.

An expert is necessarily a pinhead and is indispensable for technical work, but how are we to learn the significance of the processes of society. Is society to drift, or is it to be guided by thinkers who can discover its tendencies, their causes, and results that will follow.

Materialism has so deadened the imagination of man in the western world that creative art and poetic inspiration have ceased to fire him to a realization of his possibilities. If a thing cannot be used in the making of money we have had no use for it. Educators have had to convince legislators and philanthropists of the value of an educated mind as a producing agency of wealth and not of culture in order to secure money for educational institutions.

It is undoubtedly true that an inventory of the activities of Europe reveals a society undergoing a rapid and fundamental metamorphosis. These tendencies may be regarded as terrifying or inspiring: the former if they are menaces; the latter if they are opportunities which may be utilized to create a more humanitarian society than man has yet seen. Are we approaching an eclipse of western civilization or a new era finer in ideals and richer in service? Is man to be sentenced to create the beginnings of a new order out of chaos, or is he capable of reconstructing a new order out of his past achievement? Man himself is the answer.

THE MEXICAN VAQUERO OF THE TEXAS BORDER

BY J. FRANK DOBIE

University of Texas

NOTE.—Throughout this article the word *white* is for convenience used in the local sense and not at all scientifically. It does not apply to the Castillian Mexicans, who are rather numerous in the Southwest, many of them owning ranches and stores and engaging in the professions. These white Castillians look down socially upon the *peon*, the *mestizo* (half breed), the *vaquero* class of Mexicans even in a more patronizing manner than do the Anglo-Texans.

From Port O'Connor east to the Sabine and circling north to the Red River, the cowboys of Texas are, for the most part, negro and white; in the great Panhandle plains, they are generally white; but in all the millions of acres from San Antonio down to the Gulf of Mexico and thence north and west clear to El Paso, they are predominatingly Mexican. The Mexican *vaqueros* are not, of course, accepted as "white" by the Americans, but they are regarded and they regard themselves as above the negro. No Mexican ever descends low enough into *pelado* caste to look upon the black as his equal; "*cómo un negro*" (like a nigger) is his supreme expression of contempt. On the smaller ranches and stock-farms in this Rio Grande region, the Mexicans are presided over by the American owners or American bosses. On the larger ranches the overseer, called *mayor domo* or *administrador*, is nearly always white, but the straw bosses, or *caporals*, are frequently Mexican.

What the first sergeant is to the army, the *caporal* is to the ranch corps. He is the "George" that does it. The outfit that he accounts for is called a *corrida*. The individuals of the *corrida* are the *cocinero* (cook), the *remudero* (horse wrangler), and the *vaqueros* (cowboys). All of these terms are in the vernacular of Texas borderers.

The *cocinero* generally gets about 25 per cent higher wages than the *vaquero*, but his job is never envied. Indeed, a good *cocinero* is harder to get than a good *caporal*. True, his hours are long, for he must get up earlier and go to bed later than

the *vaqueros*; but he has a deal of time to himself, is lord of his own domain, and, conscious of his own rarity, has promoted the custom of having the men he serves to grease his wagon, harness his horses, often drag up his wood, and more than often butcher and dress his meat. Pride and nothing else prevents the *vaquero's* seeking his job with its higher pay; there never was a mounted man in any service in the world who did not come it proud over the man on foot. The *cocinero's* job is not exactly one for a lazy man, though lazy Mexicans often ask for it and the typical steward of the chuck wagon is easy natured and a great talker and a hearty laugher. Driving his four-mule wagon away from camp, he sings like a drunk sailor; as he leans on a wagon wheel listening to the hands praise his barbecued goat ribs, his soul expands like that of a jolly landlord. He glories in his power to please or displease his boarders, by a mere pinch of salt as it were, and actor-like he plays for approval. He may be dirty, wasteful, exasperatingly slow, but he will stack and wrap the pones of bread so as to keep them warm, and he will never leave old coffee grounds to embitter the fresh coffee. He is the butt of all good-natured jokes, but no man considers his own belly so lightly as to provoke his resentment.

The *remudero* is a specialist. His sole business is to herd, drive, and, in general, care for the *remuda* (saddle horses). Years ago, before the advent of "horse pastures," he was an exceedingly important member of any outfit. He must be a man of judgment with a natural interest in horses. The amount of work a *corrida* could do depended on how he handled the *remuda*. Out from the saddle, the horses must never be trotted or galloped; they must be given plenty of time to water; they must not be herded too close; and theirs must be the choice of the range. Generally, the *remudero* was a well-seasoned man, picked for reliability. Nowadays, he is often a boy or else some stiff-jointed old *vaquero* no longer capable of hard riding. Professional *remuderos* have ceased to be; their work is, except on few ranches, only periodical; hence a good one is more than difficult to find.

While the *remudero* was passing, another kind of specialist, the *jinete* (horse breaker) was developing. In the old days, every *vaquero* was, by virtue of his occupation, a *jinete*.

Nowadays, half the *corrida* of a big ranch may be afraid of a pitching horse, and as for the mongrel outfit that is assembled on a small ranch in cattle-gathering season, frequently not a man among them will want to mount a horse that shows the white of his eyes! Many ranches no longer raise horses; they are bought, and the young *potros* are "broke" by specially hired *jinetes*, who go from ranch to ranch. A *jinete* trained in the old school will make the *potro* pitch whether the *potro* wants to pitch or not. He will spur him in the shoulders, quirt him, maybe lean over and bite his ears, take his hat off and hit him over the head with it. His theory is that no horse is gentle until he quits pitching, and if the horse never starts pitching, how in the devil is he to quit? Every horse, he argues, has a pitch in him, and like the measles, he had better have it and get done with it. I have known more than one *jinete* whose insides were so shaken that he took to spitting blood and subsequently contracted tuberculosis.

On the *haciendas* of Northern Mexico every *vaquero* is still expected to gentle his own mount or to manage whatever pot luck gives him in the way of bad horses. There he puts the Mexican bit, the cruellest contrivance since thumbscrews were abolished, on the tender mouthed *potro* the first day he saddles him. In Texas, the *jinete* has been forced by his more humane and sensible superiors to ride first with a hackamore and snaffle bit, and later to get the horse bridle-wise with a stiff bit. However, the average Texas *jinete* is still brutal.

A great American officer once said: "A soldier without pride is not worth a damn." The same is true of the Mexican cowboy, and if his worth be measured by his pride, he is the worthiest laborer under hire. He resents being put to work tanking, despises even fence building, and looks upon the farm laborer with mingled contempt and pity; he regards the *pastor* (goat or sheep herder) as an imbecile below the level of respectability; and however much he may love the *cocinero*, he regards him somewhere short of respect. Notwithstanding these facts, more and more of the *vaqueros* in the lower country are turning to cotton picking every fall.

The *vaquero's* pride reveals itself in his rope, or *mecate*. This the ranch may furnish, but as roping injures any animal, the modern ranchman has little regard for it; consequently,

the ranch ropes are often fitter for dragging a poor cow out of the bog than for lassoing a steer. Therefore, out of his own pocket the *vaquero* buys a rope that will sing in the air and that he can "twine" even a coyote with—and it is easier to rope ten Brahma bulls than a single dodging coyote.

The rope he buys is of manila fiber, preferably with an interwoven pattern of gay color. The least dampness will make one of these tightly twisted ropes as stiff as a piece of "slick wire," and to prevent such stiffness the rope is sometimes greased with linseed oil or with *sebo* (tallow). The first thing the happy owner does is to tie a Mexican knot in one end and to weave the noose-slip, or *hondo*, in the other—and he can tie knots and splice breaks with an art unknown to any other class of men save mariners. With the new rope all ready, he itches from finger tip to spurred heel until he gets an opportunity to "stretch" it, and if he is not watched, he will make an opportunity of the first "cow-brute" that he can run off.

Sometimes he carries a rawhide rope, a *reata*. This he makes himself. The *reata* maker takes a green hide and starts cutting a narrow strip from the outside, circling around and around until he comes to the center, the long, flat thong at his feet looking like a spring coil. This he stretches so taut that it will thrum, scrapes the hair off, and leaves to dry. After it has dried, he softens it in water and twists it until the edges meet in a spiral smoothness as perfect as that of the old "Virginia Twist" leaf tobacco. The *reata* must now dry in the shade and be worked and rubbed with *sebo*. If properly "cured," it will outwear a piece of "bob wire."

Another kind of rope that the *vaquero* makes is the *cabestro*, or hair rope. This is woven from the manes and tails of horses, and I have seen cow-tail utilized, but the latter is too coarse and has not the strength of horse hair. By means of a little wooden contrivance of his own make, the weaver weaves out a strand of any desired length. He may weave one strand of silver gray hair, another of raven black, and a third of lustrous sorrel. The combination is a beautiful thing to see but too light and soft for use as a lasso. It is excellent as a stake rope or tie rope and, according to a superstition still common among ranch folk of whatever race, a rattle-

snake will not crawl over it. Hence some out-of-door sleepers encircle their pallets with *cabestros*.

At the *rodeos* in Southwest Texas, Mexicans do not enter the roping contests, but there are plenty of Mexicans who could give the white men a chase for their money; in fact, they will probably average better as ropers than the American cowboys who work with them. A great many particular ways of roping have Mexican names for which there are no English translations. The *mangana* is a roping of the fore-feet; roping the hind-feet is called the *peal*. Both these throws are extensively used. In running wild cattle in the brush, the *vaquero* has no room in which to swing his rope; he gets as close as he can to the animal, leans over to one side, with an upward movement of the arm shoots the loop straight ahead, and casts the *peal*. The *mangana* is an easy, but violent, way to throw a running animal, and I have seen a wild horse's neck doubled up under him are broken snap-in-two in the fall. Inside the pen, *vaqueros* work in close coöperation. One will rope an animal around the neck; a second man *peals* it, sitting back on the rope, while a third "tails" it to the ground.

The *mangana de pastor* is a cast of the rope that catches an animal about the neck, and with loop crossed like the figure 8, catches the fore-feet in the lower half of the loop so that they cannot slip out. It is a beautiful cast, and is often employed on calves and goats but is hard to use on wide-horned animals. Another cast that requires a great deal of skill is a certain way of catching an animal by the neck and crossing the loop so as to ensnare the nose; this is a fancy throw fit only for roping horses. Another throw still more fancy is the *magana de pie*. It is a *mangana* cast by the foot instead of by the hand; the loop is laid flat on the ground, the toe of the boot is slipped under the noose-knot, and as the animal runs by, the noose is half-kicked, half rolled out. But one can hardly see this fantastic throw in these times, though years ago when horse raising was as common as cattle raising now is, it was sometimes employed to *mangana* horses. I knew a one-armed Mexican who was expert at it. Finally, the most awkward throw known to *vaqueros* of any race is that which catches an animal around the body. It results from having too big a loop, and tenderfeet inevitably blunder into it.

Of course the *vaquero* class, like all other classes, is changing; but where brush and big pastures, rocks and the Big Bend remain undisturbed, the *vaquero* remains primitive in his wants and crafty in his ability to supply those wants. The more remote the ranch he works on, the less is his pay and hence the less whetting has his appetite for luxuries. Lacking money to buy a pair of leather leggins, a *vaquero* fashions himself *chivaros* of cow hide and *tapaderos* (toe fenders) of the same material. From horse mane, he weaves the finest *cinchas* (girths) in the world, the most durable, the least likely to cut and gall. Fancy and fine bridle reins, hackamores, and *bosals* (a kind of nose strap) he plaits of the same material or of finished rawhide. Given a saddle-tree, he can almost rig it. If a mule dies, he will make the skin into enduring wagon lines. He is not so good as his brother in Mexico at making buckskin, but there are rare Mexicans on this side of the river who understand that art. If he is fresh from the other side, he may wear *guaraches* (sandals) of rawhide, but ere long he shares with the acclimated Texas Mexican the supreme ambition to own a pair of high-heeled boots, a pair of shop-made spurs, and a shop-made bridle bit trimmed with Mexican silver coins. He can never buy, however, a *cuarta* (quirt) or a *chicote* (whip) equal to what he himself can make. Surely one of the bravest sounds in the whole world is the crack of one of these perfectly plaited rawhide whips with a buckskin lash on the end of it finished off with a shining little horse-tail snapper. But no mere cow hand, Mexican or white, can ever hope to accomplish the great sounding *chicote* crack with which the big cowman on his favorite cutting horse heads out a steer from the herd.

The average ranchman who knows Mexicans and can get them had rather work them than white "boys." They cost less, demand less, and on the whole are more efficient. They have not yet taken on the softness of the "drugstore cowboy." As brush hands they have never been excelled and the border country today has plenty of *vaqueros* who can trail as true as any Indian or frontier scout ever trailed. Truly they are *hombres del campo* (men of the camp). Let me record an incident. Some years ago I was running a *manada* of wild

horses, trying to pen them. I was alone, they were "spoilt" about penning and they were feeling their—mesquite beans. The weather was dry, the ground caked over so that tracks were not always distinct. We ran for hours, crossing and twisting, through brush, over rocky hills. When we finally got into the pens, I reached for my watch and found that it was gone. I was satisfied that the fob had worked outside of the leather belt of my leggins and that a limb had caught it and raked the watch out. But I had no time to hunt for it, as I was leaving the ranch that afternoon. I told Genardo Bosques, our faithful ranch Mexican, that I had lost my watch but that I did not think he could trail my horse over the tracks of the other horses, especially as we had circled around and crossed our own trails in various places. When I returned three months later Genardo handed me my watch. He had found it the afternoon I left, he said. To his eye the track of the horse I had ridden was different from all other horse tracks; he had followed it for miles and had picked up the watch several yards off to one side of the trail, where a raking limb had cast it.

To me the *vaquero's* treatment of his horse has always been something of a paradox. He is proud of a good mount; he can get the "last inch of go" out of any kind of mount; but he is generally inconsiderate of his horse to the point of cruelty. He cares little whether the horse gets a drink when he is thirsty, and he picks the most convenient spot to stake him whether that spot has good grass or not. Of course many *vaqueros* are exceptions to the generality; I speak of the class. If the *caporal* assigns a *vaquero* a poor mount, he resents the assignment, not that he cares particularly about doing more work on a good horse, but that his pride revolts at a "plug" for his saddle—and he takes out his resentment on the poor "plug." He generally hurts his horse's back in the summer time, and he does not particularly mind going on riding him. In every *remuda* that has been much used you will see horses with flaming raw scalds on their withers and sides, and great blue, swollen sores called "set-fasts" on their loins and backbones. A genuine set-fast never completely heals and hairs over. Even after months of rest, a *caballo matado* (for so a horse with a set-fast is called) will grow only a thin, hairless

tissue to cover the sore, and half a day's riding will peel it to a blood blue ugliness. Sometimes a sore-backed horse will hump himself when the girth is tightened, especially if the weather is cold; sometimes he will pitch from the pain. After he gets warmed up, the pain dies down, and the service of the horse—to a callous-hearted rider—is not much impaired.

The color of a horse goes a long way in determining the average *vaquero's* choice, the pinto having first place, the blanco (white) last, probably because the skin of the latter is generally so tender. A half Indian Mexican once told me a "secret" for picking a horse, and I will tell it to you. Go into a pen, stand in the center, scare the horses into a gallop, and when they stop note the one that holds his head up the most alertly and with the most curiosity. He is the horse with the best *animo* (spirit); pick him. Such a horse the young bloods will pick, but the old hands know that the best cow horse may stand even in a seething corral with one hip resting and head down, half asleep.

The indifference of nature to suffering is a platitude. Savages—human beings living in a "state of nature"—are as indifferent as their "mother." Indifference to suffering means cruelty. The *vaquero* is half Indian; he still has the instincts of savagery. He may overcome his indifference to suffering sufficiently to be careful of his horse—though often he will keep a thirsty horse tied up for hours when in five minutes he might water him; but he seldom has sympathy for animals in general. He does not work oxen, but if he did work them, he would, like his brother across the Rio Bravo, yoke them by the horns instead of around the neck. He will rub sand in a sullen cow's eyes to make her get up, beat her over the head, or twist her tail until he breaks the bone. (The average Anglo-American cowboy is equally insensate to the feelings of a "mean" cow or horse.) The *vaquero* will rope a wild hog and leave it tied down for days before he goes to bring it in. He simply has no feeling for what we call "dumb creatures." He is kind to his family, but his wife is little more than a squaw slave. I doubt, however, if she feels her slavery, for she is nearly always cheerful and often gay as she carries water in a vessel balanced on her head or grinds corn into *masa* on her stone *metate*.

Yet despite his cruelty, the *vaquero* has a certain artistic sensitiveness. In a delightful paper on the "Lore of the Texas Mexican Vaquero" (*Publications of the Texas Folk-Lore Society*, 1927), Miss Jovita Gonzáles has shown his poetic interpretation of the dove, the ceniza, and other forms of animal and plant life about him.

He is hospitable, generous, trustworthy, faithful. If he has but one cup of coffee and a stranger comes to his *jacal*, he will pour water into his one cup and make it two cups. He has the reputation of being treacherous, but as a matter of fact the Mexican that has served any length of time on one ranch is almost invariably loyal to his *amo* (master) and faithful to his interests. "I have roots here; I do not want to pull them out of the ground," said to me an old Mexican named Genardo Bosques, who lived on my father's place for nearly thirty years. I would trust him with all that is nearest to me in life. On another ranch I knew an old Mexican, named Juan Juarez, past 80 years old, who spent fifty years with one *amo*. His own possessions amounted to a wife, seven children, an old sway-backed mare and a mangy colt; but he was so careful of his *amo's* interests that if he found a bit of rawhide string carelessly dropped on the ground, he would pick it up and place it in the harness room. Had his *amo* not lost his fine ranch in the recent downfall of the cattle business, old Juan would yet be living on it with plenty of goat meat and *tortillas* as long as he could chew. Some St. Louis restaurant keepers own the ranch now. Many a time I have heard Juan give thanks to God for preserving the health of his *amo*.

A *vaquero* never heard of being paid for "over-time." He knows no "over-time"; with him there is no "over-time." His time is all day and all night, too, if necessity requires all night. For uncompaining loyalty, he is probably an equal to the "befo' de wah" darky and as trustworthy. He takes infinite pride in the sayings, in the appearance, and in the possessions of his master.

On occasions he will break loyalty to his own blood in order to keep trust with his *amo*. But it is really asking too much to ask him to turn against or "squeal" on one of his own race. In him the tribal instinct is strong, and along the Rio Grande the very phrase, *los rengers* (the rangers) is a signal for

blood loyalty as effective as the bonfires that used to rally the Highlanders of Scotland along the English border. However "straight" her husband may be, no Mexican woman ever feels at ease if she knows *los rengers* are abroad; however proud he may be, no Mexican man is ever other than humble in their presence. A Mexican's supreme act of revenge is to inform *los rengers* on another Mexican against whom he bears a grudge. If a Mexican fence rider happens upon some rangers or custom officers, after being friendly and accommodating with information that he does not possess, he rides on to a certain gate that he knows a *tequila* smuggler may pass through. "*Vale mas que pone una seña*" ("It'll be better to put up a little sign"), he says to himself, and then he will tie a bit of rag to the fence near the gate, or cut a leaf of fresh prickly pear and put it in the middle of the road, or maybe arrange a significant pattern of sticks. The *tequilero* will understand; to the gypsy, the pattern speaks not a more distinct language.

No man who has worked both negroes and Mexicans ever fails to remark the difference in their appetites and tastes. The negro wants cornbread and all the sorghum he can get; the Mexican disdains cornbread except when made into *tortillas*, and seldom has a sweet tooth. He eats less than the negro; he craves meat like a mountain lion. Of course if he works on a small ranch, where meat is a rarity, he contents himself with frijoles and bacon; but he will leave a meatless job that pays him \$35 or \$40 a month in order to work for \$20 or \$25 on a big ranch where meat is a staple of diet. Most of the larger ranches keep goats and also they are freer about butchering beef than the little ranches are. The flesh of *chivo* (meat goat) is preferable to that of *cabra* (female goat)—it is stronger; but the meat of meats is beef. The *vaquero* always feels a wonderful elation at the proximity of beef, and the elation seems to be stronger right after he has eaten of it than before. My memory runs back twenty-five years; I am on our old ranch down in Live Oak County; we have killed a fat cow that afternoon and are at supper. I can hear my father saying, "We'll have singing tonight." Sure enough, by the time we are through and out on the gallery, the long drawn out notes of Mexican songs are coming up from the camp "down

at the well." The coyotes wailing over the offal that was dragged at the horn of a saddle out into the brush are not more tuneful or happy.

The *vaquero* likes to sing. I wish I could describe his song. I cannot. It is a wail; it is, no matter what the spirit of the song, a note of sorrow, of something far, far away; it seems to go quivering up to the stars; it is wild; it is barbaric. The whistle of the *vaquero*—how romantic to hear him coming over some trail through the darkness a mile away whistling the melody of "La Golondrina" (The Swallow)—has the same inexpressible sadness and weirdness. The song is often of love, like "La Paloma" and "Carlotta." It may be home made, a ballad of the folk. Perhaps it is the ballad of Heraclio Bernal, the Robin Hood bandit of Northern Mexico, or the ballad of Pancho Villa, or the ballad of Gregorio Cortez, who killed three Texas sheriffs. Perhaps it is a ballad that has grown out of the daily work of the singer's own *corrida*.

I give the circumstances of one representative ballad of this class. A *vaquero* of Duval County was running a *ladino* (outlaw steer) in the brush; he kept trying to get close enough to rope the steer; his horse was "played out"; finally the horse could no no farther; the *vaquero* dismounted and sat under a comal bush while his horse rested. As he waited the *vaquero* made up some *versos* about this chase of a *ladino* steer on a broken-down horse. That night when he rode slowly into camp he was singing the *versos* to a familiar tune, and the song of "El Caballo Fragado" (The Broken-Down Horse) became the song of the ranch on which he worked.¹

Despite the fact that the tunes of his songs are generally mournful, the words are often humorous, and the *vaquero* himself has a very keen sense of humor. One winter while my father and I with several Mexicans were going after a bunch of yearlings three days' drive from the ranch, a cold wet norther hit us. By the time we struck camp we were all cold, wet, and wretched. One of the Mexicans—Tomás was

¹For fuller treatment and various examples of the *vaquero* songs see "Versos of the Texas Vaqueros," by the present author, and "A Mexican Popular Ballad," by W. A. Whatley, in *Publications*, No. V (1925) of the Texas Folk-Lore Society.

his name—had on a pair of rawhide *chivaros* (leggings). Generally they were about as stiff as tin roofing, but after they got thoroughly wet, they were as limp as dishrags. Now Tomás, like most *vaqueros*, wore his *chivaros* on foot as well as on horse, and in the course of time, what with the wet norther turned to a dry norther and a big fire of mesquite sticks throwing off heat, the *chivaros* dried on him. After much labor Tomás got them off and when he did, he furnished us one of the best comedies that I have ever seen. He balanced those *chivaros*, like a pair of dented stovepipes, near the fire, and, standing off, addressed them and had them reply in character. He carried on the dialogue until everybody forgot there had been such a thing as cold and wetness. Tomás's own legs may have been stiff, but there was no stiffness in his improvised comedy.

The *vaquero* reads little, if at all. An almanac, a book of songs, and a dream book make a full library for any *jacal*. Consequently, he reads outside of books. He has a thousand weather signs; he knows a thousand legends about ghosts and buried treasure along old trails and by old ranches. He is familiar with the habits of every creature of the country. He is a profound herbalist, ready to compound *remedios* for every ailment from native weeds and bushes. For him every hill and hollow has a personality, a name. He knows the stars; he watches the phases of the moon. He is a child of nature; he is truly *un hombre del campo*.

THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF RENAN

BY PHILIP GEORGE NESERIUS

Louisiana Polytechnic Institute

Of the noted intellectual leaders France has produced, not the least worthy of remembrance are Voltaire, Ernest Renan, and Anatole France. Strangely different from their contemporaries, they resembled each other in more than one particular. All of them endeavored to live out the truths which they commended to their fellow men; each succeeded in presenting a message of personal, social, and political idealism. They were worthy of a great tradition, for learned in the lessons of the past, they were concerned with the present, and as earnest about the future. They express their ideas with conviction, vigor, and feeling. Therein consists their appeal, and the force of their assertions.

The political and social philosophy of Renan, thoroughly permeated by metaphysics, suffers from the capriciousness and unseizable vagueness of his mind. At every point he was a prince of inconsistencies.¹ From transcendentalism in ethics, idealism and utopianism in politics, he drifts at times to utter disdain and bitter pessimism.²

¹Gaston Boissier, *L'Académie Française, Recueil des Discours, Rapports et Pièces diverses*, tome I, p. 808; Émile Faguet, *Historie de la Langue et la Littérature française*, tome VIII, p. 397. Cf. G. Monod, *Renan, Taine et Michelet*, pp. 40, 48; *Souv.*, pp. 73, 62, 116-117; *L'Avenir de la science*, p. 43; *Averroès et l'averroïsme*, p. 170; *Discours de réception*, pp. 41-42; *Conférences d'Angleterre*, pp. 237-238. "La question que l'auteur se propose est précisément celle que tout penseur agite, sans pouvoir la résoudre; ses embarras, ses inquiétudes, cette façon de retourner dans tous les sens le noeud fatal sans en trouver l'issue, renferment bien plus de philosophie que la scolastique tranchante qui prétend imposer silence aux doutes de la raison par des réponses d'une apparente clarté. La contradiction, en de pareilles matières, est le signe de la vérité," *Le Livre de Job*, LXVII. Cf. *Drames philosophique*, p. 176; *L'Ecclesiaste*, p. 24; Gabriel Séailles, *Ernest Renan, Essai de Biographie psychologique*, VIII, p. 341.

²Cf. Séailles, *Ernest Renan*, pp. 213-214; *L'Avenir de la science*. See also Bourget, *Essais de psychologie contemporaine*, p. 96; Perogot, *Renan, ou l'égoïsme intellectuel*; *L'Ecclesiaste*, p. 93; *Souvenirs d'enfance et de jeunesse*, pp. 111, 64.

An aristocrat by intellect, Renan believed himself to be a superior being in whom the apogee of civilization had been reached. A Breton, he always adhered tenaciously to the feeling of racial superiority which is characteristic of his native province. His claim to intellectual aristocracy was attained only by rigid subjection to a discipline of seriousness and industry, which precluded all possibility of levity or frivolity, and confined his whole life to the pursuit of reason, of the ideal. Through his study of history and of science, he was convinced that everything should be subordinated to intellectual progress. His own interests were so completely scientific and intellectual that he subordinated to them political, social, and ethical considerations. Having thus prepared himself for a life of the elite which would raise him above the common level to which he could never return, he remained throughout his life the staunch advocate of an intellectual, political, and social aristocracy.

To make practical his scheme of government by the intellectually elite, and to remedy the defects caused by a democracy, unwilling or unable to recognize and employ expert knowledge, Renan proposed a system of indirect voting, supplemented by a provision for examinations somewhat akin to our public service examinations. All the male citizens were to vote for the members of an electoral college, who in turn would elect the deputies for the lower chamber. The mediating electors, it was expected, would be local aristocrats, men of distinction and authority, who in a purely disinterested manner would choose competent and efficient men to represent the people. Although he was unfailing in his criticism of the inertia and irresponsibility of the nobles before the Revolution and of the existing plutocracy which had followed close upon its heels,³ he favored hereditary seats in the Upper House. For he assumed that advantages of education and racial stock would be natural accompaniments of nobility, and that they would enable the government to be controlled by men whose intellectual equipment was the finest in the country. The use of examinations was to insure government by experts,

³*Drames philosophiques* p. 333. Cf. *Averroès et L'averroïsme*, pp. 79, 395, 413, 415, 350; *Réforme*, p. 243.

and to remove all doubt concerning a man's mastery of the subjects he professed to know. Perhaps if Renan could have seen how farcical our system of presidential election has become he might have had less faith in the efficacy of indirect suffrage to achieve his purposes.

Renan thus dreamed of an ideal world in which humanity would be led to salvation by the meditations of philosophers, where the wise man, the man of true merit, would receive the honors which are now conferred upon the possessors of large fortunes. "L'essentiel est moins de produire des masses eclairees que de produire de grands genies et un public capable de les comprendre."⁴ ("The chief thing is not so much to produce enlightened masses as it is to produce great geniuses and a public capable of understanding them.") His sympathies always rested with the elite. He deprecated the fact that in our civilization, where material prosperity forms man's highest goal, where idealism flourishes only with great difficulty and under a cover from which it seldom emerges, the person of noble instincts and delicate sensibilities cannot succeed, for he is sure to be worsted in competition with those who are actuated by the vulgar impulses of egotism. He thus allows himself to be overcome with pity for the unfortunate lot of the cultured elite whose manifold advantages he overlooks.

It is not anomalous, therefore, that he favored an oligarchy in which the reins of government are held by a privileged class, by men of exceptional mental ability, vested with full power to act at their own discretion. Virtually they wield the scepter of a monarch, and if they consider it indispensable to sacrifice millions of lives in order to obtain their ends they are at liberty to do so; for that is merely one of the misfortunes which the race must bear.⁵ It is Renan's belief that this intellectual mesocracy, this reign of the superman alone, can solve the problem of government. For if it be admitted that reason has the right to control the destiny of mankind, then the sovereign power must be in the hands of those who excel in this faculty.

Renan's ideas about government by the intellectually elite reach their climax in his conception of the scientific state. His

⁴*Dialogues philosophique*, p. 103.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 13.

scientifically organized society is a dynamic one.⁶ Influenced by the political misfortunes of the Franco-Prussian War, he meditated deeply and at length upon his political and social views, his conception of the *Übermensch* evolved a marked similarity to that later conception of Nietzsche, where the race of heroes cannot come into being without struggle, pain, suffering, and injury to the weak.⁷ This goal is reached through the agency of science and through a scientific state which not only elevates the genius to a position of honor, but also is quick to recognize merit.

The triumph of this kind of state, however, is to be accomplished not by peaceful and rational tactics, but by the advanced science of warfare. Armaments will be perfected and will be controlled by the most enlightened of the population with the result that they will be able to master any situation which may arise. Their right to power will be uncontested, and thus free from molestation, they will govern the world with greater wisdom. Their military force will act rather as a means of intimidation than as actual machinery for the purpose of destruction. The army will exact obedience, for the engines of war will produce "a hell, not a chimerical hell, but a real hell."⁸ Since the people live in a materialistic world where only the concrete has significance for them, it is necessary to threaten them with concrete punishment. To meet any emergency of insubordination this had to be kept in reserve; for all doubt of the infallibility of a ruler as well as the slightest disobedience, had to be punished by immediate death. Renan has presented here a very skilful plan for a Tsardom of the elite, an excellent program for a revolutionist reign of terror, which is autocratic, tyrannical, and intolerant. Apparently, personal liberty meant for him liberty of the superior individual.

Half in jest and half in earnest, Renan has described an ideal social order, in which reason at last is the undisputed sovereign of the world. The progress of science, he suggests, may conceivably lead to the discovery of new forms of force,

⁶*L'Avenir de la science.*

⁷Brunetière, *Cinq lettres sur M. Renan*; Lichtenberger, *Gospel of the Superman*.

⁸*Dialogues et fragments philosophiques*, p. 108.

so hard to wield and so dangerous to manipulate that only a few superior minds would be capable of turning the same to practical use. In the hands of these intellectual giants, veritable gods as compared with even the choicest intellects of the present day, these hidden forces would be instruments of truly superhuman power. The mass of mankind, lacking capacity for such knowledge, would be forced to submit.⁹ The power which popular fancy ascribed to magicians of old would rule the many in virtue of mysterious influences which they alone understood. Such a government would be despotic, to be sure, but not therefore unjust; for Renan supposes these magicians to be as high above the average in virtue as they are in knowledge. It would be the beneficent tyranny of justice and truth. As soon as it was discovered that the power of these demigods was always in the service of right, there would be no objection to its exercise; and very soon these heaven-born rulers would come to be loved and their commands be accepted like irresistible natural laws.¹⁰ In the course of time, having discovered the secrets of matter and of life, they would rule over physical creation likewise, and eventually come to be worshiped as gods: *Primus in orbe deus fecit timor*.¹¹

This is mere dreaming, of course, but it points in the direction of Renan's ideal of social organization. An enlightened, despotism, not supposedly but truly enlightened, and despotic only in the sense of being all-powerful, was his *beau idéal* of political order.¹²

Another form of government which met with his approbation was that of the Berber tribes. Indeed, he refers with intense pride to the civilization of these tribes. Their government was "une démocratie naïve,"¹³ which was in reality an aristocracy based on the merit system. The common kabyle, or assembly, exists as a symbol of the uncontested sway of tradition, and is composed of men who have been selected for

⁹*Dialogues philosophiques*, p. 82.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 112.

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 113. Cf. *Fragments philosophiques*, p. 153ff.

¹²Cf. *L'Avenir de la Science*, pp. 350-352; *Souvenirs d'enfance et de jeunesse*, p. 335.

¹³*Mélanges d'histoire et de voyages*, p. 334.

the superior interest they have manifested in the public welfare. This little political aristocracy which conferred no titles, which resulted from esteem for the services rendered, and which imposed, as a condition for eligibility, only such freedom from material cares as to permit the individual to devote himself to the community, seemed to Renan an admirable example for France to copy as a solution of her problem of government. Both the Arabian political aristocracy in Spain which succeeded the Cordovan caliphate,¹⁴ and the intellectually aristocratic government of the Tsung dynasty in China likewise were to him of supreme excellence.¹⁵ Their method of choosing candidates for gubernatorial positions was based on literary ability and other proofs of fitness presented to the rulers. This method seems to have anticipated Renan's own desires.

The government of Germany was also in accord with Renan's ideal. No chauvinistic patriotism ever forced him to suppress what he considered to be the truth. Convinced of the German genius, he fearlessly proclaimed his belief in it, displeasing as it did his own countrymen.¹⁶ So great was his respect for the German genius in all its activities, that even the results of the Franco-Prussian War did not lessen his admiration for his Teutonic neighbors. The political, military, and intellectual leadership of Germany as it existed before and immediately following the Franco-Prussian War embodied for him more than that of any other country the principles of science as opposed to democracy. It was his earnest desire to effect a political and social renaissance, to have France again occupy a place of primary importance among the nations. To effect this change he looked towards Germany for his ideal. The genius of the Germans was an aristocratic one, ignoring equality and even respect for personality in its efforts to in-

¹⁴*Mélanges d'histoire et de voyages*, p. 284.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 363.

¹⁶This had aroused Mazini's indignation and in an essay entitled *M. Renan and France* he accuses Renan of inertia, of subordinating morality to intellect, and of carelessly and indolently advocating a return to the past instead of attempting to eradicate the evils which were destroying the vitality of France. Renan's theory contradicts the true conception of history. Naturally this steady exponent of democracy would condemn Renan's attitude toward the people.

crease the intellectual force of the race. If, therefore, the world were to be ruled by reason, Germany would be the best fitted for the responsible position of director-general.

One could readily suspect that Renan had little sympathy, on the whole, with socialism as a project for the reorganization of society on a basis of equal rights for all men. Not that he was blind to the manifold injustices of the present social regime, or felt no sympathy with the undeserved sufferings of the less fortunate classes. He admitted that socialism was a well-grounded protest against the present order. His want of sympathy with the movement appears rather to have sprung from a conviction that the wrongs for which socialists are seeking a remedy are beyond the power of man to remove, being inherent in the nature of things.

He was much impressed with the analogy of socialism to early Christianity. The two movements seemed to him to spring from a common source: the evils and sufferings and general unsatisfactoriness of average human life in this world. The great consolation of man, he says with reference to the New Jerusalem, in the presence of the incurable evils of society, is to imagine an ideal city, from which he excludes every sorrow and which he endows with every perfection.¹⁷

He notes a fundamental difference, however, amounting to contrast, in their respective conceptions of the possibilities of human nature. In the Christian economy, the reign of justice, impossible on earth because the "prince of this world" is the "prince of darkness," is deferred to another life, and constitutes the reward of those who are worthy to enter the heavenly city. Socialism, on the other hand, with its different conception of nature and of man's place in nature, also less certain of man's future, and with more faith in his present, hopes to establish its New Jerusalem on this planet. In other words, socialism is Christianity modernized and secularized. Christianity is socialism minus its faith in man; socialism is Christianity minus its faith in God.

But the parallelism of the two also extends to details. Each held that all progress comes from the hope of doing better or

¹⁷*History of the People of Israel*, III, 400.

avoiding worse.¹⁸ Moreover, like Christianity, socialism is international in its sympathies and aspirations, a serious matter, considering that socialism is a live issue in politics. If, therefore, socialism ever becomes an established fact, he says, it must sooner or later lead to national decay.

And so Renan was unable to fit himself into any existing democratic society: "Nos machines démocratiques excluent l'homme poli." ("Our democratic machinery makes impossible the civilized man.") No one has felt more keenly than Renan the antipathy of the superior man to democracy. Although during the early part of his life he believed in the efficacy of democratic institutions,¹⁹ he later (1870) assumed an antagonistic attitude towards democracy. His *Réforme Intellectuelle et Morale* is one long tirade against democratic institutions. The very source of democracy is condemned. Popular government, he believes, springs from a false and ignoble view of life, being based on envy and selfishness. Democracy, he believed a cause of national weakness and transgression and a contradiction of the first and greatest of nature's commandments: Be strong!²⁰ Moreover, democracy rests on a fallacious assumption of human equality. Renan charged democracy with unfitness to attain what he considers the principal *raison d'être* of national existence—the production of great men. It is through great men that humanity will work out its salvation.²¹ But democracy, he insists, is doomed to mediocrity in all things.²² A house of sand lacking the necessary cement between past and present, it stands condemned by its own inherent instability. France committed suicide the day it beheaded its king.²³

It would be mistaking Renan's meaning to conclude that he intends by these charges to condemn constitutional government. Indeed, a truly constitutional government is just

¹⁸*L'Avenir de la science*, pp. 373, 158; *Mor. Crit.*, 18. Cf. *Réforme Intellectuelle et Morale*, p. 111.

¹⁹*Correspondance, E. Renan et M. Berthelot*, I.

²⁰*Réf. Int.*, pp. 49, 18, 29–30.

²¹*Dialogues et Fragments philosophiques*, p. 103.

²²*Essais de morale et de critique*, pp. 371–373.

²³*La Réforme intellectuelle et morale*, pp. 250–252.

what democracy is incapable of producing. Anyway, no political institution whether contrived by the wisdom of the few or the ignorance of the many, is capable of securing the happiness of mankind. Considered historically, he says, constitutional government is not a creation of democracy. England, which instead of the absolute doctrine of popular sovereignty, admits only the more moderate principle that there must be no government without the people, nor against the people, has been far better governed than France.²⁴

The most sympathetic attitude which he has anywhere taken towards democracy occurs in his preface to the *Souvenirs* (X-XX) where different forms of political organization are compared with regard to the influence they are likely to exert on the progress of reason, of which the first condition is declared to be freedom of thought and speech.²⁵ An obvious criticism which his treatment of democracy provokes is that he condemns it in general terms, without considering the historical, ethnographical, geographical, and political conditions in which it is placed. If democracy is a failure in one country, that can prove nothing against its being a permanent success in another. The same nation, indeed, not only may, but does need different forms of social and political organization at different stages in its development. It is of course impossible to decide questions as to the relative worth of political institutions one way or another in the form of general propositions, regardless of the special conditions under which these institutions are tested.

The *coup d'état* of 1851 had obliterated whatever democratic sympathies he had and had given an added impetus to his aristocratic hopes and plans. His credo thereafter was that

²⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 240, 43-45; *Drames philosophiques*, pp. 85, 89; *Correspondance*, E. Renan et M. Berthelot, pp. 69, 395-396; *Réf. Intellectuelle*, pp. 67, 147.

²⁵*Souvenirs d'enfance et de jeunesse*, XIII. Cf. *Réf. Int.*, pp. 99-100. "Le monde marche vers une sorte d'américanisme, qui blesse nos idées raffinées, mais qui une fois les crises de l'heure actuelle passées, pourra bien n'être pas plus mauvais que l'ancien régime pour la seule chose qui importe, c'est-à-dire l'affranchissement et le progrès de l'esprit humain," *Souvenirs*, etc., pp. 16-17, 20, 10-11, 12. Cf. *Dialogues et Fragments philosophiques*, p. 77.

intellectual advancement would always be the achievement of a very small number and that knowledge is not intended for all. To claim, therefore, that all should participate equally in the government is to ignore the mass of evidence to the contrary.²⁶ The erroneous methods of democracy steeped in jealousy and vanity refuse to support a culture superior to that of the majority. Democracy tends to prevent the advancement of superior men and women and leads to mediocrity and materialism.

The Commune increased his contempt for the people. The defeat of France during the lamentable years of the Franco-Prussian War had been a severe blow to him, notwithstanding the delectable accusations of anti-patriotism made against him by the Concourts and others. In the *Réforme*, he attributes the defeat to the Revolution which had introduced democracy with all its concomitant evils. In order to cure France of this ravaging democratic disease and to restore her former national vitality reason would have to assume the leadership. Regretting the measures adopted by France for rehabilitation in 1871, he bent his efforts towards inducing the country to abandon her democratic policy and follow the example of Germany, who after the memorable days of Jena subordinated everything to the preservation of the state.

He gave little attention to the psychology of the popular mind at this time. He did not take into consideration that very few would have been willing to relinquish their recently acquired power in favor of even the most benevolent of despots. He was not, however, impervious to the significance of contemporary history. After the permanent establishment of the Third Republic, we can detect a new spirit in his works. In place of resistance and defiance which he had displayed toward democracy, there is the beginning of resignation, though he continued to exhort the country to adopt his reforms of 1871. He accepted France as she is in the hope of seeing some of his theories emerge from the republican débris. Although he does not espouse the cause of democracy, he is willing to admit

²⁶*Etudes d'histoire religieuse*, p. 18. Cf. *Dialogues et fragments philosophiques*, p. 65; *Averroès et l'Averroïsme*, p. 9; *L'Avenir de la science*, p. 105.

that it has its advantages over the *ancien régime*.²⁷ If the government is not what he would like it to be, he is at least willing to struggle along with it toward a happier solution: "Pauvre France Malo tecum errare quam ceteris sapere."²⁸

On the other hand, the praises which aristocracy gets from his pen are many and generous. His preference for aristocratic institutions is based on something more than an impartial examination of their comparative merits. They sprang from an unduly conservative mind. All civilization to him is of aristocratic origin.²⁹ An aristocracy of the wise was the law of primitive man.³⁰ It is by aristocracy that the inferior races have been disciplined, grammatical language created, laws framed, and morality and reason developed.³¹ Even today its services to the state are incalculable.³²

Renan considered inequality of individuals indispensable to intellectual progress. Jealousy, not liberty, begets equality, the death-warrant of civilization. However, he never failed to affirm his condemnation of inequality imposed by the powerful over the weak for purely selfish advantages. The perpetuation of inequalities in most cases, however, he says, becomes the means of a higher existence for the elite.³³ But let us be clear that Renan did not wish to crystalize existing inequalities into a rigid caste system, though he insisted that it is absolutely essential that sane ideas on inequality be inculcated into the people of the world in order to prevent the irremediable decadence which is consequent upon false notions of equality.³⁴

²⁷*Drames philosophiques*, p. 110.

²⁸*Mélanges d'histoire et de voyages*, p. 14.

²⁹*Drames philosophiques*, p. 85.

³⁰*De l'Origine du Langage*, p. 25.

³¹*Drames philosophiques*, p. 99; *Correspondence*, p. 395.

³²*Conférences d'Angleterre*, p. 122; *Réf. Int.*, pp. 67, 244; *Dialogues et Fragments philosophiques*, pp. 64-65; G. Séailles, *Ernest Renan*, pp. 269-270. "La vertu diminue ou augmente dans l'humanité selon que l'imperceptible aristocratie en que réside dépôt de la noblesse humaine trouve ou non une atmosphère pour vivre et se propager," *Essais de morale et de critique*, p. 23. Cf. *L'Avenir de la science*, p. 319ff.

³³*Drames philosophiques*, p. 223; *Dialogues philosophiques*, p. 16; *L'Avenir de la science*, p. 324.

³⁴*Réforme intellectuelle et morale*, p. 94; *Discours et Conférences*, p. 310, and cf. *Réforme*, pp. 53, 243, 246, 248.

The inequality of races was a divine decree which he did not controvert. He would have been astonished at the assertions of modern anthropologists to the effect that no innate intellectual differences exist between the so-called superior and inferior races. The inequality of races was an undisputable and established fact in his mind. He considered the Chinese as a race of manual workers "sans aucun sentiment d'honneur,"³⁵ and the negro suited only for manual tasks. He denied that, as humanity is now constituted, the mental development of all races, all nationalities, or all individuals, is equal.

His attitude toward the colonial policy of France is the direct result of his theory of political mesocracy. Since it was the fore-ordained mission of France to civilize the world through her intellect, it was necessary to subdue the natives inhabiting the territory which she might choose to occupy. The domination of an inferior race by a superior, was in perfect harmony with nature's laws. Nor was there any inconsistency, he believed, in the employment of force to usher in an era when intellect should reign supreme. He therefore condones the conquest of backward races, inasmuch as it means their regeneration, the hastening of the day when science should be proclaimed *Imperator mundi*. It seems, however, that Renan's mental horizon was obscured by an attack of myopia, which prevented his glimpsing even the tendency of developing conditions.

In spite of the fact that the right of personal liberty was one of the prime tenets of his belief, he declared slavery legitimate, if necessary, for the maintenance of a superior

³⁵*Réforme intellectuelle et morale*, pp. 94, 197; *Dialogues philosophiques*, pp. 16, 64; *Drames philosophiques*, p. 223. "L'inégalité est légitime toutes les fois que l'inégalité est nécessaire au bien de l'humanité. Une société a droit à ce qui est nécessaire, à son existence quelque apparente injustice qui en résulte pour l'individu. . . . La possibilité et les besoins de la société, les intérêts de la civilisation priment tout le reste. . . . Je vais jusqu'à dire, si jamais l'esclavage a pu être nécessaire à l'existence de la société, l'esclavage a été légitime; car alors les esclaves ont été esclaves de l'humanité, esclaves de l'oeuvre divine, ce qui ne répugne pas plus que l'existence de tant d'êtres attachés fatalement au joug d'une idée qui leur est supérieure et qu'ils ne comprennent pas," *L'Avenir de la science*, pp. 378-379. Cf. *ibid.*, notes 156 and 157. See also his *Dialogues* and his *Drames* where the doctrine is often reaffirmed.

society. Slavery that serves to promote a richer intellectual life, received his approbation. Yet he censured Christianity for not abolishing slavery in the days of the Roman Empire, and for the inhumane treatment by the Church he could see no valid excuse. In spite of his utterances concerning the legitimacy of slavery, however, he appears to have had too much regard for intellectual liberty to favor such a static society.

Renan's love of the people never was very conspicuous. The masses in their ignorance, he said, are much happier than they would be if they opened their eyes to the harsh facts of life. His attitude of indifference gave way to one of utter disdain for the crowd, to a state of mind totally lacking in intellectual charity. Indeed, he allows himself to grow insensitive to the suffering of his inferiors, who he believed should be immolated on the alters of his god, though he violently opposed the sacrifice of superiors. Realizing poignantly that the ignorance of the people was a great impediment to the consummation of his ideal, and that progress has always been retarded by the mistakes of the inexperienced, he favored the idea of blind submission to the will of superiors, which, though not highly beneficial to the race, yet conforms with a philosophy which subordinates means to ends.

Though he insisted that it is not the ergatocracy that creates, he made the concession that the masses are entitled to privileges. In return, however, they must assume additional duties. Duty, he considered, not primarily the counterpart of privilege, but an aristocratic dignity belonging to all superiors, whether individuals, nations, or races.³⁶ It is surprising therefore, that he should make this anomalous concession. It is simply an example of his many contradictions.

In the three dramas, *Caliban*, *L'Eau Jouvence*, and *Le Prêtre de Nemi*, Renan, representing the masses in all their most repulsive aspects, advances a reason for condoning their immorality. The application of his theory of mesocracy to the field of morals results in a double standard, one for the elite, and another for the multitude. Virtue, being a responsibility

³⁶*Nouveaux cahiers de jeunesse*, p. 99.

which accompanies education, only the elite can be held accountable for it, and each person's responsibility shall be commensurate with his degree of enlightenment. Hence the masses have the right to be immoral. Indeed, it is their immorality which makes possible the unhampered progress of the rest and is the guarantee of their liberty.³⁷

In spite of his belief in slavery and the inequality of individuals, foremost among civil liberties in Renan's estimation are free thought and free speech. He was thoroughly modern in the distrust he showed for abstract natural rights. A liberty which exists in fact as well as name is not the result of mere constitutional enactment. Civil liberty is not assured until it is rooted in institutions which have long endured. Without personal freedom political liberty is the merest sham.³⁸ This seems to have been his normal point of view, though he did not hold to it consistently. In *L'Avenir de la science*, for example, he insisted that free speech, like universal suffrage, cannot be reasonable until all men have acquired the capacity to distinguish between truth and error. The right freely to express one's thoughts presupposes a capacity to think aright, for there can be no such thing as a right to disseminate falsehood.³⁹

Legal guarantees of free speech, he considered of little importance. A man who is really in the right is always sufficiently free to disseminate his convictions. In some respects, indeed, opposition to innovating ideas is a good thing. When would-be reformers are obliged to risk their own lives in the advocacy of their cause, the peace will be disturbed only by those who are sure of their message.⁴⁰ Moreover, the suppression of free-thought is impossible. You may imprison individuals but you cannot imprison ideas. A heretic placed on the rack may alter his language, but his private conviction is beyond the reach of external coercion. Even when free thinking was synonymous with reasoning and men were burned alive for professing their real beliefs, free thinking was not

³⁷*Drames philosophiques*, p. 171; *Feuilles Détachées*, p. 374.

³⁸*Questions Contemporaines*, p. 411.

³⁹*L'Avenir de la science*, p. 357. Cf. *Mor. Crit.*, p. 161; *Questions Contemporaines*, p. 477; *Conférences d'Angleterre*, pp. 26-27.

⁴⁰*L'Avenir de la science*, p. 362; *Questions Contemporaines*, pp. 303-304.

in reality suppressed. All that philosophers needed to do was to twist their own language into harmony with what was expected.

The needs of society, Renan repeatedly affirms, must in all cases take precedence over individual rights. Whenever personal liberty comes in conflict with social welfare, it is the latter which ought to prevail. It is so throughout nature. Any curtailment of individual liberties is right, even to slavery itself, if the welfare of society demands it.⁴¹ The moment a doctrine acquires universal acceptance and is made the foundation of social and national existence, society is right in punishing those who attempt to subvert it.⁴² If the doctrine of the Church had been true, he says, the Inquisition would have been a beneficent institution. As it was, however, he condemned the Inquisition, with all its cruelty, on the ground of not being in the service of truth.

No one, however, was more averse to universal suffrage than Renan. Of all the absurdities of democracy, he says, the most idiotic is the institution of suffrage. He declared that the majority had the right to govern if it knew better than anyone else what was best for the common good. But that condition being contrary to fact, universal suffrage would be ruinous to the commonwealth. He did not believe that the best way to have the people learn to govern themselves was to have them make the experiment, regardless of disastrous blunders. His opposition to universal suffrage persisted to the end of his life. It is remarkable, however, that at one time he had been a pioneer champion of *self-determination*—which seems almost incredible—and was among the first to advocate the substitution of the plebiscite for the ancient and disreputable practice of forcible annexation.⁴³ In the years 1848, 1851, 1870, however, there had been cumulative evidence that the majority was not capable of deciding what it wanted, and that consequently, if all the caprices of the mob should be followed, the result would be utter chaos. In 1871, therefore, he directed his energies

⁴¹*L'Avenir de la science*, pp. 378-379. Cf. *ibid.*, notes 156 and 157.

⁴²*Ibid.*, pp. 345-347. Cf. *Essais de morale et de critique*, p. 161; *Souvenirs d'enfance et de jeunesse*, pp. 112-113.

⁴³See the Essay: *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?*

toward combating universal suffrage, the greatest adversary of intellectual mesocracy. Direct universal suffrage, he argued, would lead inevitably to demagoguery, mediocrity, vulgarity, and materialism, for the people mistrust men of ability, preferring to elect men of their own mental status.⁴⁴ Universal suffrage, in short, is either unwilling or unable to recognize and employ expert knowledge.

Renan could never forgive what he called the unparalleled recklessness of the French statesmen of 1848 for conferring universal suffrage upon the country when it was not even called for.⁴⁵ His objections to the ballot box have become platitudes. It affords no criterion of right policy, of true theory, or of wise and efficient administration. On the contrary, the appeal to the ballot box is an appeal from knowledge to ignorance, and from civilization to barbarism. Furthermore, the people are always exposed by their love of flattery to the evil designs and malpractices of the "peripatetic political practitioner."⁴⁶

In *L'Avenir de la science*, he says that the more direct method of actual battle is preferable to the counting of heads, since the truth is likely to be with those who are impelled by conviction to risk their own heads in defence of their claims.⁴⁷ Besides, he asks, by what right can a majority, merely as such, claim the privilege of deciding a nation's destiny? The only justification of government is the good of humanity. But to realize this good is not necessarily the same thing as to obey the will of the greatest number. If, therefore, in a

⁴⁴*Discours et Conférences*, p. 123; *Drames philosophiques*, p. 82.

⁴⁵*La Réforme intellectuelle et morale*, pp. 14-15, 303.

⁴⁶*Drames philosophiques*, p. 383; *Feuilles Détachées*, p. 171. "La masse n'a droit de gouverner que si l'on suppose qu'elle sait mieux que personne ce qui est le meilleur. Le gouvernement représente la raison, Dieu, si l'on veut, l'humanité dans le sens élevé (c'est à dire les hautes tendances de la nature humaine) mais non un chiffre. . . . Le suffrage universel n'est légitime que s'il peut hâter l'amélioration sociale. Un despote qui réaliserait cette amélioration contre la volonté du plus grand nombre serait parfaitement dans son droit." See also *Réforme intellectuelle et morale*, pp. 47, 67-68; *L'Avenir de la science*, pp. 349-350; *Questions Contemporaines*, p. 302.

⁴⁷*L'Avenir de la science*, pp. 344-345.

given instance the majority, whether from ignorance, prejudice, or any other cause, is found to oppose the best interests of humanity, including its own, is it not right that mere plurality should be carried along by a wiser minority, even against its will?⁴⁸

Since, however, the people were a force in government, he considered it the duty of the State to educate its citizens, that they might form an intellectual electorate, and that reason might rule the world. Indeed, he considered education to be a propelling force in any society. For the training of those who were to run the government he relied almost entirely upon institutions of higher learning. Far from being hotbeds of bolshevist radicalism, or even from being propagators of democracy, such institutions of higher learning will be "des pépinières d'aristocrates."⁴⁹ He does not convince us that the governmental elites turned out by these institutions would be benevolent, but he leaves ground for doubt as to whether or not they would be despotic. Perigot says: "Plus positive, on le peut augurer; mais plus humaine, assurément non."⁵⁰

Renan's efforts to interest the people in improved facilities for education are not contradictory to his ideas on intellectual aristocracy. For although opportunities for learning will be extended there will always be superiors, those who excel in the culture of a particular time will continue to advance with equal rapidity. They will not remain stagnant until the rest have attained their stage of development.⁵¹ Later, however, when the Commune increased his contempt for the people, he retracted his ideas on education to such an extent as to declare that primary education itself was a menace.

He believed in the restoration of the monarchy because with its disappearance had come political and social retrogression and administrative corruption. A dynasty to him was the

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 429-430; cf. 340. "Le bien de l'humanité étant la fin suprême, la minorité ne droit nullement se faire scrupule de mener contre son gré, s'il le faut, la majorité sotte ou égoïste. Mais pour cela il faut qu'elle ait raison. Sans cela, c'est une abominable tyrannie," *L'Avenir de la science*, p. 429.

⁴⁹*La Réforme intellectuelle et morale*, p. 102.

⁵⁰Perigot, *Renan, ou l'égoïsme intellectuel*, p. 309.

⁵¹*Averroës et l'Averroïsme*, p. 197.

most adequate symbol and representative of the continuity and stability of an aristocracy. He does not specify the prerogatives of the crown, but we can assume they would be by no means great in this limited constitutional monarchy. He did not desire to return to the ancient regime. He rather hoped for the reestablishment of a benevolent aristocracy, in which the nobility would exercise its proper functions of limiting the power of the king and defending the rights of the people.⁵² His predilection for royalty and nobility sprang from a fundamentally conventional or unduly conservative disposition. His motive was to preserve the past to produce a still better future.

Modern writers, influenced by the study of history, the theory of evolution, and the rise of social psychology, give less attention to the influence of race and geography on the development of national consciousness, and lay chief stress upon the gradual development of a spiritual unity, resulting from common experience and tradition, and from political unity and patriotism. They emphasize feeling and will as the essential elements in nationality. Like them, Renan believed that community of interests makes a customs-union. He found the essence of a nation in a common memory of suffering or achievement, and in the conscious desire of a people to live together and to transmit their inheritance.⁵³

As a whole his conception of nationality is interesting. What constitutes a nation? Is it community of race? He answers this by another question: In which of our modern nations is this to be found? The truth is that ethnographic considerations have had little or nothing to do with the formation of modern nations. It is impossible to determine the race-element of a modern nation in the physiological sense of the term, for the zoological beginnings of humanity long antedate the origin of civilization and language. And what is true

⁵²Cf. *Questions Contemporaines*, p. 21. See also *Drames philosophiques*, p. 99; *Correspondence*, p. 395; *Conférences d'Angleterre*, p. 122; *Réforme intellectuelle et morale*, pp. 67, 244. "La vertu diminue ou augmente, dans l'humanité selon que l'imperceptible aristocratie en qui reside le dépôt de la noblesse humaine trouve ou non une atmosphère pour vivre et se propager," *Mor. Crit.*, p. 23.

⁵³R. C. Gettell, *History of Political Thought*, p. 427.

of community race applies equally, *mutatis mutandis* to community of language and religion. Neither of these, says Renan, is sufficient for the founding of a nation. Then, is it community of commercial and industrial interests, that constitutes a nation. This also he denies, for a *Zollverein* is not a *patrie*. Nor is it the "natural frontiers," the mountains or rivers that determine the limits of a nation. In a word, neither race, language, community of interests, religious affinity, nor geographical conditions—none of these are sufficient to found a nation.⁵⁴

A nation is a soul or spiritual principle, resulting from efforts and sacrifices made in the past. A heroic past, great men, great achievements—this is the social capital upon which national idea may be established. To have done great things together and to be willing to do more—such common souvenirs of a glorious past, made up of common sufferings, common joys, common hopes, consummating in a united will in the present, make for bonds of union stronger than race, language, or religion. These, he says, are the foundations of national existence.

From the fact that society is an evolutionary and therefore non-rational product, not the creation of some *contrat social*—this, combined with the fact that reason is acquiring an ever-growing influence in political and social affairs, causes Renan to conclude that political progress is destined to do away with patriotism. Social progress, he says, may be defined as a substitution of reason for tradition. With the progress of reason, considerations of humanity will more and more prevail over those of country. Patriotism, therefore, being a non-rational form of social cohesion, is certain to grow weaker as men grow more rational, and will ultimately disappear altogether.

⁵⁴*Discours et Conférences*, p. 277ff; *Conférences d'Angleterre*, p. 34; *Réforme intellectuelle et morale*, p. 138; *L'Avenir de la science*, pp. 252 and 241-242; *ibid.*, 302-303. "La patrie est un composé de corps et d'âmes. L'âme, ce sont les souvenirs, les usages, les légendes, les malheurs, les espérances, les regrets communs, le corps, c'est le sol la race, la langue, les montagnes, les fleuves, les productions caractéristiques," *Conférences d'Angleterre*, p. 34.

Renan was aware of the repulsive egotism that ultra-patriotism begets. It has, he says, the pretention of having a God all its own. "*Jahveh Élohénu*," said the Israelite. "*Unser Gott*," says the German. A nation is always egotistical. It desires that the god of heaven and earth should think of no other interests than its own. Under one name or another, it creates for itself tutelary divinities.⁵⁵

Though Renan made little of patriotism, especially in the ultra-rationalistic period of his earlier years, and though he treats it as a logical fallacy kept alive by prejudice, yet he felt it to be of the utmost importance in the interests of national strength, that the fallacy should continue widely to prevail. For a long time to come, the existence of separate nationalities is necessary for the preservation of liberty, which would be lost if the world had but one law and one master. A confederation of the world, involving the abolition of independent nationalities, even if possible, he said, would not be desirable.⁵⁶

Renan had little to say with reference to the earlier forms of human association, or the manner in which the clan, the tribe, or the nation develops. The family, and more particularly, the monogamic family, he considered necessary to the formation of great races.⁵⁷ During the hunting stage of existence, before men engaged in agriculture and accumulated great wealth, they gave to women the complete control of children. When, however, the hunting stage passed, and men became desirous of heirs to succeed to their estates or possessions, they instituted monogamy. The conjugal fidelity of women, which monogamy implies, says Renan, is the result of long-continued cruelty to her sex in the remote past. Like all great things, the family was founded by the most atrocious means. Millions of women, stoned to death, paved the way to conjugal fidelity.⁵⁸

Renan regarded religion as a social utility. There can be no question, he reminds us, of the beneficent influence of re-

⁵⁵*History of the People of Israel*, pp. I, 220; *Conférences d'Angleterre*, pp. 37-38; also *La Vie de Jésus*, p. 123; *Réforme intellectuelle*, pp. 177-178; *Correspondence*, p. 14.

⁵⁶*Questions Contemporaines*, p. 352.

⁵⁷*Dialogues philosophiques*, p. 35.

⁵⁸*History of the People of Israel*, I, p. 5.

ligion over men's lives.⁵⁹ A belief in immortality is an indispensable support of the moral life. No greater calamity could befall mankind than the universal abandonment of this belief. Fact or fiction, practical utility, he says, is more important than scientific accuracy.

Man, Renan thinks, is governed by nothing but his conception of the future. A nation which *en masse* gives up all faith in what lies beyond the grave will become utterly degraded. An individual may do great things, and yet not believe in immortality, but those about him must believe in it for him and for themselves. Faith in glory and all our pursuings of the ideal, are but another form of faith in immortality. Every noble life is built, in great part, on foundations laid in the life beyond.⁶⁰ Immortality as a hope is indispensable to an unselfish life, though immortality as a certitude he considered incompatible with such a life.⁶¹

Renan was deprived of his professorship by a law which was the very soul of the nation. The real motive of depriving him of his position by the government of Napoleon III was to appease the Catholics, though he was hailed by the Anti-Catholics, as martyr to free thought, as a man who looked upon skepticism and doubt with religious fervor. At any rate, he was an egoistical historian, a convert to the scientific ideal, to the certitudes of physical and natural science. He was, moreover, a man who waged an implacable and life-long warfare against historic Christianity. In his *Life of Jesus* he treats Christ as a perfectly natural being, a misunderstood genius. This treatment, however, was so lucid in expression and so felicitous in phrase that it gave an actual heart-warmth to agnosticism.⁶²

⁵⁹*La Vie de Jésus*, p. 184.

⁶⁰*History of the People of Israel*, p. 285; *L'Avenir de la science*, pp. 409-410; *Le Cantique des Cantiques*, XII-X§§. Cf. *La Vie de Jésus*, p. 184; *Drames philosophiques*, pp. 356-357, 360.

⁶¹*La Vie de Jésus*, p. 457; *Drames philosophiques*, p. 43; *History of the People of Israel*, IV, p. 312; *Questions Contemporaines*, p. 470. Cf. *Feuilles Détachées*, XV; *Marc-Rurèle et la fin du monde antique*, pp. 264-265. Cf. *Conférences d'Angleterre*, p. 260.

⁶²C. J. C. Hayes, *A Political and Social History of Modern Europe*, Vol. II, pp. 239-240; August H. Strong, *Christ in Creation, and Ethical Monism*, pp. 332-336.

Though Renan may not be read extensively, his ideas have permeated much of the political literature of contemporary France. Democratic France, whom he criticized unsparingly, justly and unjustly, understands him better than the cultured few he tried so hard to please. She instinctively reveres him as one of her spiritual masters.⁶³ If he repels by his aloofness, or has erected an impassable barrier by his polite disdain, this should not make one unjust toward him. We should not seek in criticizing him a mean revenge for his intellectual superiority, though this seems to be a favorite sport of his biographers.⁶⁴

⁶³R. Mahrenholtz: A carefully written article on Renan's life and work, in *Zeitschrift f. franz. Sprache u. Lit.*, XVI, pp. 50-93. See also E. Platzhoff, *Ernest Renan; ein Lebensbild*, Vol. IX, in "Manner der Zeit"; Guérard, *French Prophets of Yesterday*, p. 255.

⁶⁴E. Platzhoff, *Ernest Renan, seine Entwicklung und Weltanschauung*, pp. 1-15; Guérard, *French Prophets of Yesterday*, pp. 254-254; B. Labanca, *La "Vita di Gesù" d Ernesto Renan*, pp. 10-40.

NEW COTTON AREAS FOR OLD

BY A. B. COX

University of Texas

The states west of the Mississippi River, or the section usually referred to as the Southwest, had about thirty million acres planted to cotton in 1926. This was about 63 per cent of the cotton acreage of the United States and 34 per cent of the world's total acreage. They grew 10,100,000 bales, which was 56 per cent of the crop of the United States and nearly 35 per cent of the world's total production. The economic well-being of this region is dependent very largely on the success of the cotton crop. The larger part of the buying power of the people comes directly or indirectly from cotton. An analysis of demand and supply factors which may cause substantial changes in the volume of this income seems peculiarly appropriate at this time.

The record-breaking crop of 1926-1927 has brought a very serious decline in the price of cotton. The growers of over 50 per cent of the cotton of the United States and doubtless of the world received less than the cost of production for their cotton the past year. What possibility is there that such will be the case in 1927-1928? An answer to that question involves an analysis of the world cotton situation from the standpoint of both demand and supply.

The factors which affect the demand for cotton are not subject to as violent fluctuations as those which affect the supply except in case of an unusual occurrence like the World War. The fact of preëminent importance is that the greater the amount to be sold, the smaller the price at which it must be offered. This law is so definite in the case of cotton that, given a period of time subject to no violent social or economic changes, a definite change in the price can readily be forecast with a fair degree of accuracy from a given change in supply. It is easy to get a correlation between these items of .85 or better. Barring unusual international changes, therefore, the chief factors causing changes in price are changes in the supply

and the price level. There is likewise a close relationship between the relative value of cotton in one year and the supply in the next in so far as that supply is determined by acreage planted. The conclusions in this paper are based primarily on these link relationships.

If it is found that world demand has not kept pace with expansion of the source of supply, the next problem will be to determine where acreage reduction should or will take place. This will depend on the relative profitableness of cotton growing as compared with the cultivation of other crops and to some extent with other occupations. Any forecast of change in either demand or supply factors must necessarily be based largely on a study of what has happened in the past.

COTTON AREA CAPABLE OF WIDE EXTENSION

Cotton is a remarkable product and has had a notable history. It belongs to the mallow family of plants. The scientific name for cotton is *Gossypium*. There are many species. They are distributed widely in both hemispheres and on both sides of the equator from about 40° north latitude to 34° south latitude. This area includes almost all of three continents—Africa, South America, and Australia. In addition, all of Central America, Mexico, the cotton belt of the United States, and many islands in the western hemisphere are in the zone. In the northern part of the eastern hemisphere, it includes almost the whole of India, a large part of China, Turkey, Greece, the Japanese Empire, small parts of Spain and Italy, and large numbers of islands. The total land area included between the parallels named is well over nineteen billion acres. Much of this land is too dry, too wet, too rough, or otherwise unfit for cultivation, but eliminating this unfit land there remains enough land suitable for cotton to multiply the present cotton acreage several times over. The limitations to cotton acreage for a long time to come will be economic rather than physical.

THE RISE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF COTTON

The demand for cotton is based on one of the primary wants, the need for clothing. Historical records show that weaving

is one of the oldest arts. In the Mediterranean countries, wool was the fiber used. In northern Europe, it was hemp. It was flax in Egypt, silk in China and Japan, and cotton in India. As far back as 800 B.C. the records show that the art of cotton manufacturing was well known in India. From that time forward, the story of cotton production has been one of expansion of area devoted to production and the development of new uses and new designs in methods of manufacturing. From the standpoints of the number of people employed in growing, manufacturing, and distributing, and the numbers of uses, no commodity now rivals cotton.

As a world commodity, it is new. The English got their first acquaintance with cotton through the Arab traders. The word *cotton* is derived from the Arab word *katan*. It is sufficient merely to state that in its westward expansion cotton found its way to Arabia, Greece, Egypt, Sicily, Italy, and Spain during the first period of the expansion of its cultivation, or down to the discovery of America.

When the new world was discovered, native cotton was already being used extensively in South and Central America and in Mexico, though this cotton did not become an article of importance in the trade with Europe. Later, cotton growing became a business in the West Indies, and from there it is alleged cotton culture found its way to the United States.

The last 150 years have seen very radical changes in the volume of cotton production as well as in the sources of supply. During the period 1786 to 1790, the West Indies furnished 70 per cent of the British supply; Mediterranean countries, 20 per cent; Brazil, 8 per cent; the United States and India, less than 1 per cent; and Egypt, none. England was the leading manufacturing country at the time, but most of the production, especially that of the rest of the world outside of the West Indies, was for domestic consumption. According to figures gathered by the United States Treasury, during the period from 1786 to 1790, India and Asia produced 60 per cent of the world's crop of slightly less than one million one hundred thousand bales of 478 pounds net; South America and Mexico, 17 per cent; the United States, 9 per cent; Africa (other than Egypt), 9 per cent; and the West Indies, 2 per cent. Thus, at the close of the eighteenth century, the two

countries which were destined to supply the bulk of the world's commercial cotton, the United States and Egypt, were not thought of as important cotton producers. By 1834, the United States was producing over 50 per cent of the world's supply, and with the exception of the Civil War period has continued to do so down to the present. At the same time, Egypt took fourth place in volume of cotton production, a position she has likewise held until now. In 1906, about 65 per cent of the world's commercial cotton was grown in the United States, 18 per cent in British India, 7 per cent in Egypt, and 3 per cent in Russia.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the cotton consuming world began to feel that the limit of expansion without greatly increased costs had been reached in the principal cotton-growing countries and that new cotton areas should be found in the vast expanse of potential cotton land of the world. Moreover, the European nations saw that American mills were taking a larger percentage each year of the United States production and dreamed of a time when there would be an insufficient supply left for them. The British Cotton Growing Association was organized in 1902 to promote cotton growing in the Empire and incidentally to break the American monopoly. Since that time, similar associations have been organized in France and Belgium. Several other countries, such as Japan, Spain, Australia, Brazil, and Argentine, are spending considerable sums of money to promote cotton growing within their borders.

The efforts of these associations and nations have unquestionably been a factor in expanding the land area devoted to cotton growing, but the three short crops of 1921, 1922, and 1923 in the United States and the resulting very high prices have been the chief causes of the rapid increase in cotton acreage which resulted in the record crops of the past two years. In addition to the urge of high prices, the feeling was prevalent in Europe from 1921 to 1924 that the United States could never grow another crop of above twelve or thirteen million bales so that the growing of a supply of cotton independent of the United States became a subsidized policy of several nations.

Whatever the causes, the fact remains that the world had last year the largest acreage ever planted to cotton. The five years preceding the World War, the world's cotton acreage, according to the International Institute of Agriculture at Rome, amounted to 65,926,000 acres; for the year 1926-1927, it was about eighty-eight million acres, or an increase of over 33 per cent. Will this acreage produce more cotton than the world can consume and pay for at a price which will prevent acreage reduction?

THE WORLD'S DEMAND FOR COTTON

Before that question can be answered satisfactorily, there must be an analysis of demand or an estimate of the world's probable consumption. From 1900 to 1905, the world's production and approximate consumption of cotton was about 5.2 pounds per capita; from 1905 to 1910, it increased to 5.7 pounds, and from 1910 to 1915, the average was 7.2 pounds. These figures take into account increases or decreases in carryover of baled cotton from one period to the next but not stocks of dry goods. The average price of cotton for the first period, 1900 to 1905, when deflated by the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics all-commodity index, was 10.9 cents a pound; for the period from 1905 to 1910, it was 11.9 cents; and from 1910 to 1915, 10.9 cents.

Prior to the war, the world's demand for cotton was increasing because of two factors: the per capita increase in consumption, which was approximately .013 of 1 per cent, and the increase in the population of the world, normally about $\frac{1}{2}$ of 1 per cent each year. Based on a world estimated population for 1927 of 1,700,000,000 and the assumption that the consumption per capita is the same as the five-year pre-war average of 7.2 pounds, the world would require now about twenty-five million six hundred thousand bales each year at 15.4 cents a pound, the equivalent price in purchasing power of the pre-war average price of cotton.

The buying-power price of cotton is now below the five-year pre-war average, but the buying-power prices of most styles of cotton goods are not. Moreover, the world's production and

consumption of other textile materials must also be taken into account before an estimate of present demands can be made. The output of other textile materials taken together show a substantial increase now as compared with pre-war times. The world's production of wool before the war was about three billion pounds and is approximately that now. The world's production of silk before the war averaged about fifty-six million pounds, but it was 88,000,000 pounds in 1925, a very large gain. The world's production of rayon in 1914 was negligible; in 1926, it was 230,000,000 pounds. The increases in silk and rayon have probably displaced between one-half million and one million bales of cotton; however, it is estimated that new uses take as much cotton as silk and rayon displace.

The abnormal conditions existing since the war, especially in some countries, give insufficient data to determine statistically the probable per-capita consumption now as compared with 1913. From 1921 to 1926, inclusive, the world's per-capita consumption declined to a little over 6.1 pounds. The five-year average of the relative price of cotton based on the Bureau of Labor index of wholesale prices was 17 cents, or an increase of 29.5 per cent over the average from 1910 to 1914, inclusive. The percentage increase in price was much greater, therefore, than the percentage decline in per-capita consumption, which might mean a net gain in the per-capita consumption over pre-war at the same relative price. The change in per-capita consumption has been much greater in some countries than in others. British India, for example, consumed more than a billion pounds of cotton in the year 1912-1913, or a per-capita consumption of about 4.4 pounds; in the year 1920-1921, her per-capita consumption dropped to only 1.7 pounds and was only 3.3 pounds in 1923. Similar drops in consumption occurred in China, United Kingdom, France, and other European countries. On the other hand, there are some countries which have actually increased their consumption over the pre-war levels. The United States, for example, consumed 23.3 pounds per capita in 1912-1913, and 25.9 pounds in 1922-1923. In the light of these facts it seems safe to assume that per-capita demand will be as strong as it was before the war with the same relative price.

If then the assumption be true that 25,600,000 bales of cotton of 478 pounds net represent the present world demand at pre-war prices, is there enough or more than enough acreage to supply the demand?

WORLD'S ACREAGE AND YIELD PER ACRE

The five-year pre-war average yield per acre for the world was $165\frac{1}{2}$ pounds of lint cotton. Last year, the world's acreage devoted to cotton was about eighty-eight million acres. At the same yield per acre as the five-year pre-war average of $165\frac{1}{2}$ pounds of lint, the world had sufficient acres in cotton last year to produce about thirty million five hundred thousand bales of 478 pounds net. The estimated production of the world was 29,000,000 bales, according to the United States Department of Agriculture.

It may be argued, of course, that the per-acre yield is not likely to average $165\frac{1}{2}$ pounds of lint under present conditions because of the spread of the boll weevil and other pests, because of the depletion of soil fertility, and because of the spread of cotton to poorer land. And it should be noted that in so far as the United States is concerned, the post-war production per acre has averaged much less than the pre-war. During the five years 1909 to 1913, our average production per acre was 161.1 pounds of lint; from 1914-1920, it was 178.8 pounds; but for the five years 1921 to 1925, inclusive, it was only 146 pounds. The preliminary estimate, however, for 1926 is 187 pounds. The rest of the world has fared even worse, for, according to figures of the Department of Agriculture, the world's average production per acre for the years 1921-1925, inclusive, was only 137.5 pounds. The world's average production of lint for the past five years, 1922-1926, inclusive, has been 151 pounds per acre.

If average world production is taken to equal $165\frac{1}{2}$ pounds of lint per acre, the pre-war average, or 30,500,000 bales, with the present acreage, then the world should reduce acreage planted to cotton to approximately seventy-four million acres to grow the 25,600,000 bales required—a reduction of 14,000,000 acres. On the other hand, if it be assumed that the average of 151 pounds of lint production per acre of the last

five years is normal, then the world needs about eighty-one million acres in cotton to produce the 25,600,000 bales. This would mean a reduction of only 7,000,000 acres. These figures assume that costs of production have remained about the same.

AMOUNT AND SOURCES OF ACREAGE INCREASES

Before entering into a discussion of where acreage reductions should and will likely take place, it is advisable to find out where the increases have occurred. According to the figures of the International Institute of Agriculture, the five-year pre-war average cotton acreage of the United States was 51.6 per cent of the world's acreage. Last year, the world's cotton acreage was about twenty-two million one hundred thousand more than the pre-war average. Over twelve million five hundred thousand acres of this increase occurred in the United States and only 9,600,000 in all the rest of the world.

If the conclusion that the world cotton acreage is over-expanded be accepted, as the figures seem to warrant, there remains the problem of determining where the reduction in acreage should and most likely will take place.

THREE TYPES OF COTTON, MORE OR LESS NON-COMPETITIVE

There are three more or less non-competing types of cotton. They are what is known as short-staple cotton—cotton with a fiber length of less than seven-eighths of an inch, medium staple (often called "bread and butter") cotton—or cotton seven-eighths of an inch to one and one-eighth inches in length, and long-staple cotton—cotton one and one-eighth inches or longer. The bulk of the short cotton is grown in India and China. The pre-war production of this type was about 26.9 per cent of the total cotton grown and is now 24.4 per cent. The United States, Russia, Brazil, and Mexico grow most of the medium-staple cotton. The pre-war production of this cotton equalled about 64.5 per cent of the total crop and is now about 66 per cent. The growth of long-staple cotton is the most widely distributed. Much is grown in the United States,

but ordinarily the Egyptian supply is the most important factor in making the price, though much is grown in Peru, Brazil, the Central African projects, the West Indies, and many other islands. Most of the new areas and especially the larger ones are competing with Egypt rather than with the United States. This cotton comprises a comparatively small percentage of the total. Before the war it was about 8.6 per cent and is now 9.6 per cent.

There has been a slight decline in the percentage of short cotton grown and increases in both the medium and long staples. The decrease in the percentage of short cotton is due to the fact that China has not greatly expanded its cotton area and that the new areas in India have undertaken the production of American types. The increase in the percentage of staple cotton production has been very largely in the new cotton-growing areas promoted by England and in Peru.

MINOR COTTON-PRODUCING AREAS SUFFER MORE FROM PRICE DECLINES THAN AMERICA DOES

The world's cotton price-making machinery has been set up generally to evaluate the American, or medium-staple, type cotton. It is the largest portion of the world crop and tends to dominate the price. The price of the other growths is often quoted as so many points "on" or "off" American. The supply of American is so dominant in the market that a large crop of American cotton will force down the price of other growths, even though they have a short crop. The double hardship thus forced upon the small producers of having a low price with a low yield and the high cost makes cotton growing in these smaller producing countries more hazardous than in the United States and partly explains why they have more violent acreage changes than occur in the South. From 1911 to 1912, for example, the United States had an increase in production of 35 per cent, which caused a decline in the price of American cotton in Liverpool of 22.7 per cent. At that same time, India had a decline in yield of 16.1 per cent and a decline in price of 19.7 per cent.

While the past season has been hard on American cotton growers, they have not suffered in proportion to the growers

in some of the other countries. Our decline in price of between 28 per cent and 30 per cent was offset to some extent by about a 12 per cent increase in production. The 27 per cent to 29 per cent decline in the price of Indian cotton has been intensified by a decline in yield there estimated at between 25 per cent and 30 per cent.

The smaller cotton-producing countries experienced even more violent fluctuations than India. From 1921 to 1924, the cotton acreage in Brazil increased 144 per cent. During the next two years, it declined 33 per cent, and this year whole sections are going out of the business entirely. In Sao Paulo, the reasons now assigned for this decline are "bad seed, production of cotton of short staple and weak fiber, damage by insects, careless picking, bad ginning, and high costs." The reduction in acreage in Brazil due to take place this year will result in an acreage, for 1927, of more than 50 per cent below the peak acreage of 1923-1924. According to the International Cotton Bulletin, the cotton-growing industry in Peru is in a serious condition because of the drastic declines in price. What has been said of India, Brazil, and Peru is true of most of the smaller cotton-growing areas.

PROBABLE AMOUNTS AND PLACES OF ACREAGE REDUCTION

There is every assurance, therefore, that the acreage outside the United States has been or will be drastically cut. If the cuts in acreage in 1926 due largely to price declines in 1925 may serve as a criterion, the acreage in India, Egypt, and Brazil will be little more in 1927 than the pre-war average. In 1926-1927, these three countries had 69 per cent of the approximately forty-one million acres planted to cotton outside the United States. This means a reduction of about four million acres.

Outside of the United States, India, Egypt, Brazil, Peru, China, and Russia, the rest of the world grows less than 4 per cent of the world's crop of cotton, and the Chinese and Russian crops enter little into international trade. There is little likelihood that there will be any appreciable reduction

in China or Russia, for most of their cotton is for home consumption and neither has expanded its acreage much above the pre-war level.

Each of the other leading minor cotton-growing areas, the Sudan, Uganda, and Northern Nigeria in Africa, and Chosen (Korea) in Asia may experience slight acreage declines but will undoubtedly prove to be permanent sources of supply. Last year, the production of all four areas was less than a half million bales. A reduction in all the minor cotton-growing areas of over a half million acres is not to be expected. This will mean a total reduction outside the United States of not over five million acres.

If the world's average production is to be about one hundred and fifty-one pounds of lint per acre and the world requires 81,000,000 acres in cotton, the United States is due to decrease its area planted to cotton a total of only 2,000,000 acres. If the pre-war average yield per acre is in prospect, then the South is due to decrease its cotton area 9,000,000 acres.

In order to study most effectively probable acreage changes in the United States, it is desirable to study the area east of the Mississippi River separately from the area west of the river. The states west of the Mississippi River had an average of 1,6969,000 acres planted to cotton in the five years 1909-1913, inclusive, or about 49 per cent of the total acreage in the United States. In 1926, this section had 63 per cent of the United States acreage. Last year, there were 29,950,000 acres planted to cotton west of the Mississippi, an increase over the pre-war average of 12,995,000 acres, or 76 per cent. In 1914, the states east of the river had 18,063,000 acres planted to cotton; last year, they had 17,653,000, or an actual decrease of 410,000 acres from 1914.

The most important permanent shift in the world's cotton areas has apparently occurred in the United States. There will undoubtedly be some decline in the cotton acreage west of the Mississippi River this year, but as judged by the relative profitability of crops, that reduction is due to be not over 10 per cent. There may be a further slight decline due to abandonment of agriculture for other occupations, but in this region it cannot amount to much. Relative prices indicate that the states east of the river will have a percentage reduction of

from 12 per cent to 14 per cent. Weather conditions during and shortly after planting time may modify the present indications and either increase or decrease the above-mentioned probable reductions. A reduction for the entire belt of 11 per cent will mean about five million two hundred thousand acres. This will leave a world cotton area of approximately seventy-eight million acres for the year 1927-1928.

THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE REPORT ON IMPERIAL RELATIONS

BY ROBERT A. MACKAY

Cornell University

The British Imperial Conference which met in London last November will stand as a landmark in British imperial history. Its claim to the attention of posterity lies in its remarkable report on the relations between Great Britain and the self-governing dominions.

Their position and mutual relations are defined as follows:¹

They are autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

Or, as the definition is expressed in more idealistic terms: "Equality of status, as far as Great Britain and the dominions are concerned is the root principle governing our inter-imperial relations." "Every self-governing member of the Empire is master of its own destiny. In fact, if not always in form, it is subject to no compulsion whatever." "The British Empire is not founded upon negations. It depends essentially, if not formally, on positive ideals. Free institutions are its life blood, free coöperation is its instrument . . . though every dominion is now and must always remain the sole judge of the nature and extent of its coöperation."

Guided by these ideals—equality of status, absence of constraint, free coöperation—the report proceeds to deal with some of the specific problems which faced the conference.²

¹The text as published in a Canadian press despatch is here used.

²I have omitted reference to the insignificant changes in the King's title from "King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, etc." to "King of Great Britain, Ireland, etc." and the statements on the World Court situation and Locarno, with respect to which conditions remain as they were before the Conference.

In the first place, the Governor-General of a dominion, it is declared, should represent the King only, and not the Government of Great Britain. He is declared to hold "the same position in relation to the administration of public affairs in a dominion as is held by His Majesty the King in Great Britain." The function which he has hitherto performed as an official channel of communication between the Government of his dominion and the British Government is regarded as no longer compatible with his position as representative of the King. The report would thus relegate the Governor-General to the position of a viceroy. His position as governor, as the agent in the dominions responsible to Downing Street, would pass into history in form as it has already done in fact. His more recent function as the official channel between the dominion capital and Downing Street is provided for in the suggestion that an inter-empire diplomatic service be developed—a practical measure long overdue.

Secondly, solutions are suggested for some at least of the problems arising from the difference in legislative competence between the Parliament of Great Britain and the parliament of a dominion. At present the form requires the submission of all dominion legislation through the British Government to the King and technically it may be disallowed within a year—a power virtually obsolete. Further, certain kinds of bills must be "reserved for His Majesty's pleasure," some by requirements of dominion constitutions, some by instructions to the Governors-General, instructions now archaic. In addition, dominion parliaments may not pass legislation with extra-territorial effect, while the British Parliament may, and may legally, indeed, go so far as to pass legislation applying to the dominions or even overriding dominion legislation. The report declares that, with the exception of legislation expressly required to be reserved by statute or by dominion constitutions, each dominion should advise the King as regards its own legislation—a principle which disposes of the power of disallowance as effectively as the King's veto has been disposed of in Great Britain. As regards uniformity of legislation for the Commonwealth as a whole, reciprocal legislation by all the legislatures thereof after consultation between the various governments is declared to be the appropriate way. In case

of legislation passed by the Parliament at Westminster intended to apply to any dominion (a necessity, for example, in changing the Constitution of Canada), such legislation is only to be passed with the consent of the dominion concerned. Finally, a committee is recommended to investigate the possible effects of extending to the dominions the power to pass extra-territorial legislation.

Thirdly, as regards foreign relations, the report recognizes that the responsibility must rest for some years to come primarily on Great Britain, as is the case with defense. On the other hand, the right of the dominions to participate in formulating imperial foreign policy, and to conduct themselves their own particular foreign affairs, in fact if not in formal theory, is well established by precedent and was, indeed, formally recognized by the Conference of 1923.³ With the factual position of both the dominions and Great Britain in mind, it declares: "We felt that the governing consideration underlying all the discussion of this problem must be that neither Great Britain nor the dominions could be committed to acceptance of active obligations except with the definite assent of their own governments." On this principle, the following procedure for the negotiations, signature, and ratification of treaties and representation at international conferences was laid down.

1. Treaties should as far as possible be made in the name of the King and should always indicate to what part or parts of the Empire they apply.

2. Any member wishing to negotiate a treaty should first notify all other members. If no adverse comment is received negotiations may proceed, with the proviso that a government "must, however, before taking any steps which might involve the other governments in any active obligations obtain their definite assent."

3. Plenipotentiaries are to be appointed by the King at the instance of a government so desiring and with full powers indicating the part or parts of the Empire which they represent.

4. Representation at international conferences depends upon the nature of the conferences and, in some cases, on the state issuing the invitations. Consequently, it was

³Cmd. (1923) 1987.

impossible to lay down a single rule covering all cases, but a dominion has means of being represented in any event. In the case of conferences called by the League of Nations, a dominion can, of course, attend as a member of the League. In the case of technical conferences for some years the dominions have usually been represented directly. In other conferences there are three possible methods of representation—by a single plenipotentiary for the Empire, who is issued his full powers for any part at the instance of the government of that part alone; by an Empire delegation consisting of the representatives of all parts who desire to attend; or, if the dominions have secured invitations and so desire, by separate plenipotentiaries.

5. As regards ratification of treaties, it would seem clearly to follow, although not expressly stated in the report, that ratification is to be effected for any part at the instance of the government of that part alone. This at least is declared to be the case with non-technical treaties intended to apply to the Empire as a whole.

The report is by no means intended to be a constitution. It deals only with general principles underlying imperial relations and with a few specific problems. It is perhaps as suggestive in the questions it omits as in those which it attempts to solve. Defense, for example, is shelved with the single reference that present responsibility falls primarily on Great Britain. The position of the dominions in the event of Great Britain being involved in war, the kernel of the whole problem of dominion status, is entirely evaded. India, moreover, is expressly exempted from the effect of the report. Further, the question of appeals from the dominions to the Privy Council, a grievance in many quarters, is completely overlooked. In reality none but the problems for the solution of which there was substantial agreement are included.

Nor are the solutions it suggests revolutionary. For the most part, they merely regularize an existing state of facts to which present constitutional forms do not correspond. The Governor-General no longer governs, nor is he a satisfactory means of communication between London and dominion capitals. An inter-empire diplomatic system has long been suggested. No longer does the King disallow legislation of the

dominions, nor the British Parliament pass legislation applicable to the dominions without their consent. As for the power to pass legislation with extra-territorial effect, it has been withheld, not because it was the prerogative of a sovereign legislature, but because of the practical difficulties in the way, and these still remain unsolved. As regards foreign relations, however, the report is indeed an unique compromise between two apparently conflicting schools of constitutional thought. It does not rule out the theory of the war generation of dominion statesmen—Borden, Smuts, and Hughes—that the Empire is a diplomatic unit and must therefore act as one, rather than as several; the negotiation of treaties by the method of an Empire delegation on which the dominions are represented, begun at Versailles, or by the pre-war practice of a single plenipotentiary to bind the whole Empire (though now he must expressly represent each of the dominions), is still possible. On the other hand, the contention of Premier King, of Premier Hertzog, and of Irish statesmen, that each dominion may be a separate diplomatic unit and hence its government, of which the King is an essential part, may conduct the dominion's foreign relations without using the Government of Great Britain as a medium, is expressly accepted as impeccably constitutional. Thus neither the door to a return to diplomatic unity, nor that to further diplomatic independence, is closed.

Neither are the constitutional ideas, upon which the changes in procedure depend, new. "Equality of status" has been a watchword of dominion nationalism since the war. It found a niche in imperial constitutional law, in the idea at least if not in exact words, in the Constitution of the Irish Free State. As for the theory which follows therefrom, that the King is the head of each of his dominions, rather than the head of all through his position as King of Great Britain, this has long been advanced by constitutional liberals. What is new, however, is the embodiment of these advanced constitutional theories in a formal document representing the considered views of all the governments concerned. Thus from the welter of propaganda and *ex parte* statements of interested politicians, a comprehensive and realistic theory of the commonwealth has been evolved.

INDUCTIVE VS. DEDUCTIVE METHOD IN SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH

BY CHARNER M. PERRY

University of Minnesota

For the past several decades there has been almost constant debate in regard to the meaning of scientific method in the social sciences. The question at issue has been formulated variously as empirical method versus theorizing, experimentation versus speculation, observation versus armchair philosophizing, and inductive method versus deductive method. It is a good guess that where there has been so much smoke there has been fire also. Undoubtedly the social sciences, attempting to replace or recast traditional views and views warped by beliefs and interests of various sorts, have been forced to wage war before they could settle down to work. Undoubtedly also there has been a real point to the attack, in the name of the inductive method, on what was alleged to be the deductive method. And certainly on the whole inductive method has stood for careful, systematic, and critical thinking as opposed to loose, haphazard, uncritical thinking and believing.

Nevertheless there has been considerable vagueness in defining the issue, and at times "inductive method" has been applied to types of research which have doubtful claim either to the name or to classification as valuable knowledge. So far as formulated theory is concerned, the issue has been fairly well worked out and clarified. But the case is entirely different with regard to classroom discussion and incidental remarks in textbooks and articles concerned with other questions. It is in this realm that doctrines, which would be criticized more carefully if intended for publication as contributions to the question, have often seemed dogmatically to defend, in the name of scientific or inductive method, thinking more slipshod than that at which the polemic was originally directed. And we are sometimes inclined to think that in departmental policies, in teaching, and even in individual research the informal and not wholly articulate interpretation of inductive method has more weight than the interpretation

which men are willing to present seriously in scholarly publications.

In the present discussion I want to take for granted that on the whole the name inductive method has been used as a slogan in a worthy cause, the criticism and destruction of careless and uncritical thinking. This being taken for granted, I shall attempt to mention several things which inductive method has been thought to be but is not.

Since, for convenience sake, I speak in a general fashion, in what follows, of psychologists, sociologists, economists, etc., it is perhaps desirable to say in the beginning that I do not underestimate the importance of these disciplines or of the work being done. And of course there are a large number of able men in these fields. Most of them, in spite of suspicions we occasionally have to the contrary, have plenty of common sense. But in the social sciences there are certain views, sufficiently rare to be regarded, perhaps, as incidental, but sufficiently common to have important results; and it is these which I wish to criticize.

We may begin with a statement that seems obvious in the abstract but which is often neglected in practice. Use of the inductive method is not identical with selecting problems for study on the basis of the ease with which they can be attacked rather than on the basis of their importance and the need for a solution. The demand that we should attempt to verify our conclusions sometimes is transformed, in the name of science, into a demand that we do not bother about conclusions unless they can be easily verified. There is a certain point to a method which attempts to start with the simple in order gradually to solve the complex. But when our daily living actually requires tentative solutions of certain complex problems it seems "metaphysical" and terribly theoretical (not to say narrow minded) to demand in the name of science that we should keep our hands off the complex problems until we have solved all the simple ones. There is a certain analogy between the medieval German historians who thought that to write a history of Germany they must start with Adam and Eve and consequently were unable to get to the point where the history of Germany began and the psychologist who demands that we should find out all about white rats before we

investigate human conduct. Especially, since such investigations have not contributed noticeably to the welfare of white rats and since there is no more than the tenuous basis of theory for thinking that the behavior of white rats has any connection with the behavior of human beings.

Of course it is an exaggeration to say that any psychologist demands that we should study nothing but white rats. And yet when we examine the research work being done in the usual department of psychology, aren't we inclined to think (though we may feel that all the research being done is valuable) that the psychologist who takes a "holier than thou" attitude toward any one who writes "theoretical" articles is emphasizing availability, rather than importance, of conclusions? There is no point to selecting psychology for special criticism. Though psychology, more than any other study, has seemed in recent years to deserve the jibe that it is all facts and no conclusions, the same characteristic is present to a certain extent in the other social sciences. Even in sociology, which recently had plenty of conclusions but no facts, many men seem to be demanding that we must have lots of facts whether or not we can draw any valuable conclusions from them.

Inductive method is not identical, in the second place, with counting or with obtaining results that can be expressed numerically. It is true that whenever possible it is desirable that results should be expressed accurately and quantitatively. But it by no means follows that all results which are expressed quantitatively constitute valuable knowledge. The insignificant may be counted as well as the significant. At the present time there seems to be almost a mania for counting in the social sciences. In order to get a degree or get credit for a course, students count everything from the number of soft drink stands in town to the number of people who think they are introverted. Doubtless many things must be, and should be, counted; and it may turn out that after we have counted certain things that seem insignificant to begin with we shall find some use for our results. But one is tempted to think at times that some social scientists forget altogether any possible reasons there might be for their work and simply indulge in the joy of enumeration. Such work at worst constitutes a

harmless pastime, and often turns out well; but again it seems rather like "armchair philosophizing" for the social scientist to demand an exclusive place in the scientific sun for work which has no other recommendation than the fact that it was done on an adding machine.

There is another objection to the identification of inductive or scientific method with quantitative statement. Such identification often leads the social scientist to accept, as accurate and valuable, results whose accuracy is merely apparent, resulting from the quantitative form in which the results are presented. It is not an uncommon thing to see results which were obtained by observation unguided by any knowledge of the situation to be observed, and accepted without any criticism of the categories under which the observations were recorded, subjected to the most careful and precise mathematical treatment. Such treatment of the results is desirable; but it is no substitute for intelligent observation and careful analysis. Abstractly, no one would assert that the mere putting of results into quantitative form makes them valuable knowledge; but in practice there seems often to be almost a worship of figures. Give me statistical conclusions, says the head of the department, and I don't care whether or not they are significant.

For instance, while it is doubtless often valuable to make use of rating charts and questionnaires, one is tempted to suspect that sometimes the statistical form in which results are presented leads the investigator to give them a value which they may not have. To put the matter in another way, the attack upon theory has often led to a merely apparent abandonment of theory—an abandonment which consists of putting doubtful theories into pseudo-mathematical form.

The use of the term "objective" to designate examinations made up of questions of the true-false or multiple choice type is another illustration, perhaps, of the undue emphasis placed upon mathematical form. It may well be that such examinations are more reliable than other types; but the initial use of the invidious term "objective" seems to indicate an uncritical belief that adaptability to easy counting is *per se* a guarantee of accuracy.

Again, inductive or scientific method is not identical with substitution of a criticism of motives or methods for a criticism of results. The quick and easy way with dissenters is to show or assert that the dissenters have some moral or religious or economic interest in the results presented. Or perhaps doctrines are dismissed with a supercilious smile because they coincide to some extent with tradition. Indeed, a popular way at present of dismissing investigations conducted or sponsored by Titchener is to assert that they support views Titchener had advanced before the investigation was undertaken. Consequently, the investigation undoubtedly is mere rationalization. Economic or political opinions are condemned by the insinuation that the people who advance them favor the existing order or dislike the existing order. Such types of pseudo-criticism are often identified, by implication at least, with inductive method and the scientific spirit.

It is a commonplace that men's opinions, even their most carefully and conscientiously performed investigations, are likely to be warped by interest, habits, preconceptions and prejudices; and it is always interesting and enlightening to guess at motives. At the present time, however, when there seems to be a tendency among social scientists in the name of scientific method to deal with dissenters by the easy method of questioning motives, two points cannot be too heavily emphasized. There are few of us, in the first place, who are sufficiently free from interest and prejudice, so aloof, austere and pure, that we can demand that all views be discarded except those which are the result of unalloyed love of truth. In the second place, while suspicion of unusual prejudice may serve to put us on our guard in our examination of contentions, strictly speaking motives are entirely irrelevant to truth and error. It is impossible to tell from an examination of motives, even if we could be sure of the motives, whether a given doctrine is true or false, valuable or useless. The most reliable investigation may be carried on from the worst of motives, and a crazy man may enunciate the most profound of truths.

Nevertheless, perhaps it is excusable to guess at the probable motives of people who use motives as a means of disposing of dissent and criticism. Perhaps in some cases this way of settling questions results from an inability to reach a desired

conclusion by the evaluation of evidence. Everyone is familiar with the bit of legal wisdom: "If you have a poor case, abuse the opposing lawyer." But in most cases perhaps social scientists who in the name of scientific method dispose of dissent by calling it rationalizing are simply so convinced of their own infallibility that they find it impossible to imagine that disagreement can result from an honest and impartial investigation of the facts. Consequently, disagreement must be regarded as either dishonest or foolish. From which we may conclude that investigation of motives is much more likely to be enlightening when we are considering our own opinions and the opinions with which we agree than when we are considering dissenting opinions.

In social science of the present time the most prevalent type of irrelevant criticism is that which in the name of inductive or scientific method disposes of whole schools and movements of thought as mere theorizing or armchair philosophizing or deductive doctrine. Of course it is desirable that we should refuse to consider seriously or test in detail doctrines that seem obviously to be the result of loose thinking and to be formulated without any realization of the necessity for evidence and proof. It would be foolish to expect the social scientist to devote all his time to disproving whatever fantastic opinions might come under his notice. We must remember that the social sciences are faced with the problem of clearing their field from the debris that has accumulated through many centuries, and that the social scientists work in a field which is peculiarly likely to be invaded by the half-baked views of the population in general and other scholars in particular. All of us are tempted to believe that we know a good deal about psychology, sociology, economics, and government, if not about history and anthropology. Consequently, it is easy to explain and even justify the habit which many social scientists have acquired of saying on every occasion, "mere theorizing, mere deduction." Nevertheless, it is important to remember that such disposition of opposition is never criticism but instead an assumption that criticism is unnecessary.

At present a number of economists feel that the so-called classical economics should be thrown overboard; but most of them do think that it is sufficiently important to deserve criti-

cism. Yet the predominant criticism is simply that it is deductive. Does it have any meaning? Apparently. Is it true? It seems to be. What is the matter with it? It is deductive. There is little attempt to show that it does not account for facts as well as any proposed alternative; but there is a constant assertion that it was not intended to take facts into account. Yet it seems ridiculous to think that any of the formulators of the classical economic theory would have admitted that their theories did not account for the facts. If they had thought otherwise they would doubtless have changed their theories. It is of some interest to consider that when theories which are now regarded as "deductive" were formulated they stood as against previous theories for impartial examination of the facts. At the present time economists who themselves criticized the classical theories as mere deduction are finding their theories in turn discarded as mere theorizing. It has not been long since Veblen stood for an inductive, empirical criticism of the deductive method. Now he is the theorizer, and his views are beginning to be waved aside as mere deduction. In another field, G. Stanley Hall was once the apostle of science, induction, and observation as opposed to tradition, deduction, and theorizing. Now, mere deduction. It has been little more than ten years since McDougall was hailed as the empiricist who was to free social psychology from abstraction and place it upon the sure ground of observation. Now in many schools he is the terrible example, the horrible warning, of the pitfalls of deduction and theorizing.

I am inclined to think that the classical economics, the theories of Veblen, the views of G. S. Hall, and the social psychology of McDougall are largely "mere theorizing." But this is not to say that such theories can be condemned because they are theories or deductive but because now we have better theories; and because we can show, not that the superseded views did not intend to base themselves on facts, but that at present we have more facts and a more careful analysis of the same facts.

The slogan "inductive method" has sponsored two other doctrines, an adequate examination of which would involve a thorough analysis of what scientific method really is. Such analysis is beyond the scope of the present paper;

but we may mention and criticize briefly the doctrines in question. Inductive method has been regarded as requiring an elimination of analysis, deduction, and theorizing, and a concentration on observation. All of us are in sympathy, I suppose, with the feeling which has been increasingly characteristic of the times that we have had too much guessing and not enough careful investigation of the facts. The question is how can investigation be made more reliable? It seems certain that investigation does not consist of observing at random everything that surrounds us. Investigation is fruitful only when we analyze our problems to determine what it is we need to know, marshal our knowledge of the problem and similar problems to formulate working hypotheses, analyze and elaborate our hypotheses to find out what is needed to verify or disprove them, use our ingenuity to devise schemes for eliminating irrelevant factors from our observations, and analyze our observations to determine what they prove, what implications they have for other conclusions, and how they fit in with other knowledge. Actual observation may occupy a relatively insignificant place in the total investigation. To take an example from physics. Recently a physicist spent three years setting up apparatus for making observations which were completed within a few months after the apparatus was in place. And he doubtless spent a lot of time analyzing the work of other men, formulating hypotheses, and making guesses before he thought of the experiment. Yet at times the social scientist's demand for inductive method seems a demand, not for valuable results, but for the greatest possible number of observations. We may paraphrase an American humorist and say: "Sometimes I think it's better not to have so much information than to have so much information that we do not understand."

It is still more difficult to examine summarily the contention sometimes made at present that in the social sciences laws or results are essentially and necessarily statistical. Of course, inductive method in social science involves the use of statistics; but the assertion that the final result is necessarily in terms of averages or correlations is either a confession of temporary inability to isolate all the components in complex situ-

ations or it is an assertion that the data contain an unavoidable element of chance.

In conclusion it is perhaps not irrelevant to raise a question in regard to methods of teaching in social science. In connection with the demand for inductive method in social science research there has been an increasing tendency to emphasize, even in undergraduate courses, the actual gathering of data. Doubtless a certain amount of such work is valuable; but there seems a danger that it will crowd out other desirable training. It seems certain that the student majoring in a social science for his B.A. degree will not be able to gather for himself sufficient information to be of any great value to him when he gets out of school. And the same thing is true of the prospective teacher of social science. The data that a graduate student gathers does not constitute any appreciable equipment for teaching. The chief value of such work obviously must lie in the training it gives in methods of investigation and the respect for careful investigation which it may produce in the student. Certainly such training is a small part of what the student may expect from the social sciences. He has many prejudices in regard to the matters with which the social sciences deal. He needs to be given new ideas, new ways of looking at things. His ideas are usually vague, incoherent, and partially contradictory. He needs to be trained to make his ideas precise, to see their implications. He needs to be trained to criticize and evaluate his ideas. In actual life he will be continually making decisions in situations where there is not time or opportunity to obtain scientifically conclusive data. Consequently, it is desirable that he should be aided in formulating standards for guessing, that he be made to approach social problems intelligently and tolerantly, that he be shown, on as large a scale as possible, the setting in which social problems exist. Such statements are commonplaces; but they seem often to be overlooked in our concern with questionnaires and rats and problem boxes.

RECENT CHANGES IN THE TEXAS BANKING SYSTEM

BY FINDLEY WEAVER

University of Texas

SECTION 1.—The prohibition of state banking in Texas prior to 1905.

SEC. 2.—The law of 1905 as a result of a considerable demand for more and smaller banks.

SEC. 3.—The growth of the state banking system with statistics on its development and recent changes.

SEC. 4.—The guaranty fund law of 1909. The cost of the guaranty fund to the bankers.

SEC. 5.—The law of February 7, 1925, allowing withdrawals from the guaranty fund. Conversions to the national banking system.

SEC. 6.—The repeal of the guaranty fund law in January, 1927. How the law of February 7, 1925, meant the practical death of the principle of giving special protection to depositors.

1. State banking in Texas until the past few years has had a very rapid and steady growth. Until 1921 the number of state banks and their resources increased at a rate equal to the rapid development of the commerce and industry of the State. Following 1920, the business depression and the inefficiency and dishonesty in bank management caused the failure of an unusually large number of banks. These failures, and the conversions of many state institutions into national banks in order to avoid the expensive guaranty fund, have resulted in a decrease in the number of banks and the resources of the state system.

Before 1905 there was no state banking system in Texas. A few banks were specially chartered between 1871 and 1876 by the reconstruction government but these institutions hardly deserve the name of banking system. The reason for the lack of state banks was the provision in all the constitutions, with the exception of the constitution of 1869, prohibiting their chartering. This prohibition is an interesting reflection of the conditions existing in the United States during and following Jackson's administration and his fight against the Second Bank

of the United States.¹ The early Texans were recent immigrants from the frontier and southern states and were in sympathy with the frontier opposition to banking.²

2. By 1905 the demand for institutions to finance the development of the State became very great. This is evidenced by the doubling of the number of national banks within a period of five years, 1900 to 1905. During the same period loans and deposits doubled, a greater rate of increase than there had been before, while capitalization did not increase in proportion. The average capital stock and surplus was \$113,619 in 1900, while it was \$97,173 in 1905. This shows that there was a demand for smaller banks. Further evidence of the demand for smaller institutions is found in the large number of private banks existing before 1905.³ This need for smaller banks be-

The figures up to 1905 are from G. E. Barnett, *State Banks and Trust Companies since the Passage of the National Banking Act*. The figures since 1905 are from the Comptroller's reports.

came more pronounced just before the passage of the banking law. Other arguments for a state banking system were the aid such a system would give to the market for school bonds and municipal bond issues, the aid in securing foreign capital for the development of industries in Texas, and the encouragement of thrift that a number of small banks would give. There is some question as to the reality of these benefits. State banks have not dealt extensively in bonds; in fact, their financial position might have been made more secure by the purchase of more bonds. Savings banks have been very uncommon; however, the savings departments of commercial banks show that thrift has been encouraged. The main argument for the state banking system, then, was the need for a

¹T. B. Love, *Banking Legislation in Texas*, p. 13.

²The *Journal and Debates, Constitutional Convention of 1845* presents a table, p. 377, giving the place of nativity and the date of immigration of each member of the convention. Of the 60 members of the convention, 18 came from Tennessee, 6 from Kentucky, 8 from Virginia, 8 from the Carolinas, and 7 from Georgia. Only 5 were from states above the Mason-Dixon line.

³The number of private banks in Texas for certain years was:

1877	73	1890	148	1905	197	1920	34
1880	85	1895	131	1910	24	1925	26
1885	116	1900	190	1915	39		

wider distribution of banking facilities, something the national system could not give.

In 1904 an amendment to the constitution was passed and in the following year a banking law was enacted. The only major changes made in the system as first established have been the laws providing for the guaranty fund and the bond plan method for the protection of depositors, passed in 1909, the law of 1925 allowing members of the guaranty fund to convert to the bond plan, and the law of 1927 repealing the guaranty fund and the bond plan laws.

3. By September 30, 1905, only a little over a month after the act went into effect, twenty-nine charters had been issued. Until 1913 the growth in numbers was very great. Even in the year following the panic of 1907, the number increased by thirty-one, or by about 10 per cent. After 1913, and until 1921, the growth was still steady, but not so rapid as before. From 1920 to 1924 there was a decline occasioned by the many failures and by an increase in the number of consolidations and conversions to national banks. However, the capital, surplus, and undivided profits did not decrease in proportion to the fall in the number of institutions. There has been a tendency toward an increase in the capitalization of individual banks in the past few years. In 1910, about one-fifth of the banks had a capitalization of less than \$25,000, the minimum capital requirement for a national bank. In 1914, the percentage of banks with a capitalization less than \$25,000 was seventeen; in 1917, fifteen; and in 1921, twelve. Total resources, loans, and deposits have increased steadily up to 1924 notwithstanding the decline in the number of institutions. The details of the development are given statistically in Table I and are presented graphically in the accompanying chart. The figures plotted on the chart for the national banks in the United States and in Texas and for the state banks in the United States are taken from the reports of the Comptroller of the Currency. The figures are on a calendar year basis except those for the national banks in Texas. The latter are for the fiscal year ending October 1.




TABLE I

STATISTICS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF STATE BANKING IN TEXAS

Year.	Month.	Day.	(1) Authorized to begin business.	(2) In oper- ation.	(3) Con- verted to national.	(4) Con- solida- tions.	(5) Failed.
1905	Sept.	30	38	29	—	—	—
1906	Oct.	31	121	136	1	1	—
1907	Dec.	3	158	309	1	—	3
1908	Nov.	27	59	340	1	—	5
1909	Dec.	31	194	515	2	1	—
1910	Nov.	10	124	621	—	—	—
1911	Dec.	5	98	688	4	3	2
1912	Nov.	26	76	744	4	6	1
1913	Oct.	21	123	832	1	4	—
1914	Dec.	31	34	849	14	11	4
1915	Dec.	31	21	831	7	14	3
1916	Dec.	27	28	836	1	6	3
1917	Dec.	31	52	874	2	7	1
1918	Dec.	31	27	884	2	2	1
1919	Dec.	31	85	948	1	10	2
1920	Dec.	29	99	1,031	3	5	9
1921	Dec.	31	30	1,004	3	23	34
1922	Dec.	29	20	970	16	6	22
1923	Dec.	31	24	950	13	9	15
1924	Dec.	31	22	933	4	12	22
1925	Dec.	—	34	834	76	13	51
1926	Dec.	—	—	795	4	13	30

Year.	(6) Forced to liquidate.	(7) Failures reorganized.	(8) Voluntarily liquidated.	(9) Total resources.
1905	—	—	—	\$ 4,341,886.94
1906	—	—	—	19,322,476.39
1907	—	2	3	34,734,346.40
1908	—	3	6	40,981,430.00
1909	—	—	15	72,947,985.57
1910	1	—	15	88,103,273.56
1911	3	—	17	98,814,720.25
1912	3	—	8	138,856,497.78
1913	5	—	6	151,620,347.17
1914	4	—	5	129,053,787.41
1915	7	—	13	149,773,136.68
1916	—	—	13	206,396,990.54
1917	—	—	7	268,382,815.23
1918	—	—	8	259,881,358.96
1919	—	—	2	405,130,849.28
1920	—	—	3	391,127,907.01
1921	—	1	6	334,907,515.92
1922	—	1	13	338,693,581.72
1923	—	6	3	376,775,941.55
1924	—	8	4	391,040,367.06
1925	—	30	4	336,966,208.33
1926	—	8	—	(304,506,296.34) June 30, 1926

The large number of failures in recent years, to be noted in Table I, has resulted in changes in the system. That the significance of these changes be appreciated it is first necessary to describe the guaranty fund and the bond plan of securing depositors.

In 1909, to insure that depositors be paid in case of a bank failure, the depositors' guaranty fund feature was added to the Texas law. The guaranty fund law also provided an alternative method of protecting depositors known as the bond plan. All banks organized after January 1, 1910, and all existing at that time were required to choose one of the two methods of protecting depositors. Of those banks choosing the guaranty fund system, only those deemed to be solvent by the State Banking Board, created by the act, were to be admitted to the system.

To secure depositors under the bond plan, a bond made by a person or persons, firm, or corporation, authorized to make such bond, was to be deposited with the Commissioner of Banking after it has been approved by him and the judge of the county in which the bank was engaged in business. The bond was to be equal in amount to the capital stock of the bank unless the deposits were in excess of six times the capital stock. In the latter case, additional bond equal to the excess was to be provided. As surety companies and others who could have made bond were unwilling to take the risks of this business, the bonds were always signed by stockholders or officers of the bank.

Banks electing the guaranty fund plan were to pay in to the State Banking Board, on January 1, 1910, 1 per cent of the daily average deposits for the preceding year ending November 1, 1909. Banks incorporated within a year after the date the act went into effect, January 1, 1910, or banks incorporated after January 1, 1910, were to pay 3 per cent of the capital stock as a credit fund to be adjusted on November 1, after their first year of operation. This adjustment was to be made on the basis of their average daily deposits. Thereafter, 1 per cent payments based on deposits were to be made annually until the guaranty fund thus created amounted to \$2,000,000. In 1920, the amount was increased from \$2,000,000 to \$5,000,000. The burden of these annual payments was light-

ened by allowing the banks to pay 25 per cent in cash and the remainder in a deposit to the credit of the State Banking Board. If, at any time, because of the withdrawal of a bank, taking with it its share of the guaranty fund, or because of a failure the guaranty fund was depleted to an amount less \$5,000,000, or less than the amount in the fund on the preceding January 1; or, because of any emergency or period of unusual failure, assessments in addition to the usual 1 per cent were to be made. In no case, however, were the assessments in any one year to exceed 2 per cent of the average daily deposits. In 1915, 1916, and 1919, several advances were made from the guaranty fund to pay non-interest bearing depositors of a failed bank without a special assessment on the members of the guaranty fund system. After 1919, failures became so numerous that all funds necessary for a failed bank's liquidation were secured by special assessment, thus leaving the cash fund held by the State Treasurer intact.

When a failure occurred, the Commissioner immediately took charge through a liquidating agent. The non-interest bearing depositors were paid from the fund as quickly as their claims could be proved. The guaranty fund then became a general creditor of the bank along with the interest-bearing depositors and other creditors; however, the fund was always by far the most important creditor. All assets of the bank were then liquidated, assessments were collected from the stockholders, and surety bonds were collected. Then the guaranty fund banks shared in the dividends. The amount of the assessments and advances for any failed bank less the dividends paid during its liquidation constituted the cost to the guaranty fund bankers. This cost may be considered as almost the total cost of the failure as the losses to the interest-bearing depositors were comparatively small.

As most of the state banks had always belonged to the guaranty fund system rather than to the bond plan, they lost heavily because of the extraordinary number of failures after 1920. All the banks that failed until the middle of 1925 were members of the guaranty fund. After 1925 the number of bond plan banks was increased by the withdrawals from the guaranty fund to the extent that bond plan failures became about as numerous as the failures of guaranty fund

members. Table II shows the assessments and advances and the estimated cost of failures to the banks. It will be noted that the burden of costs was particularly heavy after 1920.

TABLE II

ASSESSMENTS AND ADVANCES AND THE ESTIMATED COST OF FAILURES,
TEXAS STATE BANKS

Year.	Assessments and Advances.	Dividends Paid.	Cost of Failures.	Cost as a percentage of capital stock.
1911	\$ 119,615.62	\$ 76,550.16	\$ 43,065.46	.0018%
1912	13,697.90	1,369.79	12,328.11	.0004%
1913	No failures.			
1914	78,943.30	74,862.78	4,080.61	.0001%
1915	88,030.86	59,953.16	28,077.70	.0009%
1916	331,545.36	53,986.32	277,559.04	.0087%
1917-18	No cost.			
1919	189,164.93	163,598.13	25,566.80	.0065%
1920	788,851.35	264,495.66	524,355.69	.0108%
1921	6,289,058.50	1,242,875.06	5,055,283.44	.1062%
1922	2,168,260.41	_____	1,613,589.92*	.0364%
1923	1,042,299.77	_____	687,279.85*	.0162%
1924	2,396,809.87	_____	1,583,214.51*	.0375%
1925	3,421,327.48	_____	2,249,522.82*	_____
1926	913,934.00	_____	600,912.60*	_____

The capital stock of the member banks decreased so much during 1925 and 1926 that the percentage of cost of failures to capital was not calculated. In the preceding years cost is calculated as a percentage of the capital stock of all banks, Bond Plan banks included, though Bond Plan banks pay no assessments. The reason for this is that the capital stock of the two classes of banks could not be separated. The Bond Plan banks were few in number until 1925.

NOTE ON THE METHOD OF CALCULATING THE FOREGOING FIGURES.—The figures on the assessments and advances up to July 15, 1922, are from information found in the reports of the Commissioner of Banking. As no reports have been made since 1922, the figures up to 1925 were obtained from the liquidation records. These figures were then checked with those for the fiscal year ending September 1, 1922, 1923, 1924, and 1925 as given in a letter from the Commissioner of Banking. The assessments for 1925 and 1926 were given in a letter from the Banking Department.

*Estimated.

Dividends paid up to March 7, 1925, on all failed banks were obtained from a member of the Guaranty Fund system. The rate of liquidation for each failed bank, that is, the ratio of the amount of dividends to the amount of the assessments, was then calculated. The average of the rates of liquidation for all the banks that failed prior to July 15, 1922, is 34.25%.

The estimate of costs from 1922 to 1926 is based on the average rate of liquidation. These estimated costs are, of course, estimates of the final costs. Just now the costs for the last few years are much higher than they will be after collections have been completed.

5. As a result of the increased cost of the guaranty fund system there was a demand for a change in the banking law so that a guaranty fund bank could convert to the bond plan. The law of 1909 required that a bank's election of its method of securing depositors be permanent. A change from this provision was especially demanded by the larger banks, as they bore a disproportionate share of the losses. Legislation allowing this change was passed as an emergency measure February 7, 1925.⁴ As an emergency measure, the law went into effect immediately. Under the new law, many banks changed to the bond plan. Before February 7, 1925, about fifty banks secured their depositors by the bond method. By December, 1925, there were 484 bond plan banks, while there were only 358 in the guaranty fund system.⁵ In December, 1926, there were about seventy-five in the guaranty fund out of a total of 795 state banks.⁶ Now, March, 1927, there are less than thirty guaranty fund members.

The preference for the guaranty fund before 1920 is easy to explain. As has been shown, it was very inexpensive. In some years no failures at all occurred, while in others the members were not subjected to special assessments. The average cost per member per year until November 1, 1920, was less than \$50.⁷ This was a very low cost for the advertising advantages of being able to satisfy every depositor that beyond a

⁴*Revised Statutes*, 1925, Article 475.

⁵C. O. Austin, Commissioner of Banking, in *The Texas Bankers Record*, January, 1926, p. 11.

⁶*Ibid.*, December, 1926, p. 27.

⁷W. L. Peterson, Deputy Banking Commissioner, in the *Guaranty Fund Bulletin*, October, 1923.

doubt he would always be able to get his money. Under the bond plan, the liability of directors and stockholders on the bond was too great for the plan to become popular. Members of the guaranty fund were able to remove this liability with little expense.

Many banks, since they now intended to leave the guaranty fund, changed to the national system to avoid the unsettled and expensive state banking system. During the first half of 1925 sixty-eight followed this route. These changes are especially important when it is remembered that they occurred within a very short time, principally from the first of 1925 to August or September of the same year. The increased number of banks converting to the national system and the large number of failures have appreciably lowered the number of state institutions. These changes, with the enormous losses charged off since 1920, have greatly reduced the resources of the state system.

6. In January, 1927, a law was passed which repealed both the guaranty fund system and the bond plan.⁸ The law of February 7, 1925, Article 475, *Revised Statutes of 1925*, meant the practical death of the guaranty fund and the Supreme Court's interpretation of this law resulted in the practical death of the bond plan. Therefore, the 1927 law was only a recognition of the passing of a principle of the Texas law, that of giving special protection to depositors. Article 475 granted banks the right to secure their depositors by depositing a bond approved by the Attorney General with the Commissioner of Banking. The Commissioner refused to accept government and municipal bonds which were a part of the assets of the bank because additional security above the regular assets was not being provided. Before the new law was passed, all bonds had been surety bonds and not part of the assets of the bank. The Texas Bank and Trust Company, of Austin, on February 3, 1926, secured a mandamus from the Supreme Court of Texas, requiring the Commissioner to accept bonds of the United States, assets of the bank, as security.⁹ The court said:

⁸Senate Bill 115.

⁹*Texas Bank and Trust Company v. Austin, Banking Commissioner*, 280 S. W. 161.

Our conclusion is that Article 475 of the Revised Statutes of 1925 warrants the deposit with the Commissioner of Banking of United States bonds and of certain municipal and state bonds, by a state bank or trust company, to guarantee deposits, notwithstanding the bonds constitute a part of the assets of the bank or trust company.

As the law stood before February 7, 1925, a bank was permitted to protect its depositors by filing a "bond, policy of insurance, or other guaranty of indemnity"¹⁰ in an amount equal to its capital stock. The amendment of 1925 granted the right to do business under the bond system on filing "a bond, policy of insurance, or bonds of the United States or municipal or district bonds approved by the Attorney Generals' Department, or other guaranty of indemnity in an amount equal to the amount of its capital stock."¹¹ It was held that the words, "or bonds of the United States . . .," meant that assets of the bank rather than a surety bond could be deposited. This conclusion was further supported by a review of the statute providing for protection to the state as a depositor of public funds. Protection was provided by the deposit of certain securities, bonds of the United States included. Then it has been public policy to secure certain classes of creditors of banks by the deposit of securities as, for example, the security for national bank notes. Therefore, the simple words of the law must have expressed the intent of the Legislature.

After this decision was rendered, the banks could have been under neither the guaranty fund nor the bond plan. After withdrawal from the guaranty fund a bank could deposit some of its assets in the form of bonds with the Commissioner of Banking and thus be free of any special liability to depositors. It was possible that the only special security afforded to depositors was the fact that an amount of assets equal to the capital stock had to be in liquid bonds. This was of some advantage to the depositor in case of liquidation, but he was not so well protected as he would have been if some of the

¹⁰Acts of the Thirty-first Legislature (1909), second called session, ch. 15, sec. 15.

¹¹Article 475, *Revised Statutes of 1925*.

assets had been in less liquid form and security outside the bank's assets had been provided.

All the banks took advantage of the Supreme Court's interpretation of Article 475. Members left the guaranty fund as fast as possible. The banks did not have to bear the expense of the fund and at the same time the liability of the bondsmen could be avoided. Now, the 1927 repeal completely relieves the banks of having to avoid the principle of special protection for depositors.

BOOK REVIEWS

EDITED BY O. DOUGLAS WEEKS

University of Texas

Garner, James Wilford. *Prize Law During the World War*. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927, pp. xlviii, 712.)

Professor Garner's aim in the present book is to survey the organization, function and jurisdiction of the Prize Courts during the World War, to analyze the mass of prize jurisprudence, to summarize and compare the interpretation and the conclusions of the Prize Courts of the different countries in which such tribunals were organized, and to point out the divergences of opinion and doctrine which they enunciated upon identical or similar questions. The magnitude of the task is indicated by the fact that the study is based upon laws, decrees, and decisions handed down by prize tribunals in Austria-Hungary, Belgium, China, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Russia, Portugal, Siam and Turkey. The greater part of the book is devoted to decisions of British courts; this was inevitable, both from the standpoint of the vastly greater number of cases decided by the various British tribunals and from the British reliance upon precedents which resulted in lengthy opinions.

The first part of the book is devoted to a discussion of the function, organization, jurisdiction and procedure of Prize Courts. Decrees and ordinances establishing and regulating Prize Courts and decisions interpreting and applying those decrees and ordinances are the basis for discussion. Following a general chapter on the law to be applied by Prize Courts the remainder of the volume is devoted to interpretations of substantive law. A discussion of the right of capture in maritime law precedes three chapters devoted to the law governing capture and exemptions from capture of enemy ships and enemy private property at sea. In these chapters, as in the other portions of the book, the author discusses the terms and applicability of the various Hague Conventions and the Declaration of London so fully that the book provides a convenient World War annotation of those documents. The determination of the national character of ships and of goods captured at sea, the passing of property, contraband of war, blockade, and indemnities and damages complete the list of general subjects treated.

References are given to diplomatic negotiations arising in connection with practices adopted and cases decided by belligerents, and there are a number of citations to criticisms, favorable and unfavorable, of various decisions and practices. The whole forms a valuable contribution to prize law. The book is a ready guide to Prize Court decisions; its brief statements of the positions taken by Prize Courts on the large number of questions which arose during the war are very useful.

In his preface the author speaks of his attempt to analyze prize jurisprudence "which may be said to constitute the most important contribution of the war to international law." The future must decide the accuracy of this characterization. Professor Garner's study serves to emphasize the extent and importance of the difference between practices during the World War and those which prevailed prior to that event. How far those differences in practice are contributions to international law and how far they are mere violations of international law—to what extent a development of law and to what extent a development of lawlessness—is a problem for the determination of the future. The author does not attempt to separate the wheat from the chaff; rather he adheres to the plan of presenting the practice as it appears in the decisions.

The future, for instance, must determine the effect of certain acts of the Crown upon the permanence of the rules applied by the Prize Court. One of the most important prize developments during the war was the extension of the doctrine of continuous voyage. Cases involving this doctrine were numerous and the value of the shipments, especially foodstuffs, very large. Condemnations were regularly ordered by the Prize Court and yet the Crown paid the larger shippers up to 95 per cent of the value of the "condemned" shipments (see for instance the American Meat Packers' Agreement, VIII Lloyd 473, cited Garner, p. 33 n.). These payments to the packers alone amounted to millions of dollars; payments to other large shippers undoubtedly brought the amounts paid well up into tens of millions of dollars. The real reason for the payment of such large sums of money at a time when Great Britain was hard pressed for money is not known to the reviewer; one may note, however, that the action forestalled considerable diplomatic pressure which otherwise might have forced an issue on the questions involved. The reviewer is not aware that the Crown was so considerate of less influential shippers. The permanent value of a rule established in such a manner may well be left open for the future to determine.

Prize Courts were open to neutrals during the war, but Professor Garner's book shows clearly that while claimants might seek redress there, they could not obtain it. Only too often the courts were operating under municipal orders which made it impossible for them to give the relief which claimants sought under international law. The international validity of such orders has never been determined. The situation brings in relief the necessity for an international reviewing body, such as an international prize tribunal, a mixed commission to review Prize Court decisions, or some similar body. Some means of remedying the present chaotic condition of prize law may yet be found. American claims against Great Britain have not yet been passed upon, though more than a decade has elapsed since the majority of them arose. It is to be hoped that those claims will be settled in a manner that will establish principles of prize law. Unfortunately, however, the outlook is far from bright.

IRVIN STEWART.

Washington, D. C.

Leighton, Joseph A. *The Individual and the Social Order*. (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1926, pp. xix, 578.)

The work is a masterful summary of the development of social philosophy and social ethics. Through a succession of forty-seven short chapters of well organized materials the writer carries the theme of the relations of the individual to the institutions and expressions of the social whole from the time of early Athens and her great philosophers, through the more significant writers of the early period of the Christian church and of the Renaissance, follows the contributions of the scientific movement of early modern times to present the later conceptions of Emerson, Whitman, and James. The applications of the concept thus developed compose the last, the nineteenth chapter, of part two of the book and constitute the foundation upon which the author regards our western social ethics to rest.

In the third and fourth parts of the book the writer examines the psychological and ethical bases of social relationships. In the first of these discussions he presents a modified psychological attitude with reference to the inherent factors of man's equipment as a social being, holding that "There are but four well-marked instincts in the sense of specific innate tendencies to act and to feel." (P. 238.) These are self-expression, sex, parental and gregarious instincts. To these specific congenital tendencies there are added some six or more "non-specific congenital tendencies or capacities" (P. 240), among these being suggestibility, self-expression, organic sympathy and thought. The fourth part dealing with ethical principles, makes application of the characteristics of the individual and shows how various ethical principles of hedonism and utilitarianism, rationalism, social humanism and other ethical concepts have developed, and applies to the qualities of character and the values of life. The last chapter of this fourth part returns to the ancient Greek question, "Why should one be good?" in reply to which the writer suggests "The highest incentive is the progressing attainment and enjoyment of a harmonious or integrated life as a coöperant member of the community of persons. We have many times insisted that the harmonious integration of one's several impulses or interests is the universal mark of goodness in individuals; and that the integration of selfhood is achieved only so far as the individual lives fully in interpersonal relations as a loyal member of the Beloved Community. . . . There is no enduring happiness without the integration of the self and no enduring integration of the self without active participation in the work of realizing the ideal community." (P. 347.)

In part five, the concluding part of the text, application is made of the principles already set out to the field of social philosophy. In discussing social institutions and their significance to the individual, the initial chapter of this part discusses the concept of progress, reviewing the three stages of social progress including the upbuilding of an authoritative social order to include the Holy Roman Empire and the mediaeval guilds, the second stage developing religious liberty, political liberty, and

representative government, and the third calling attention to the complexity of modern civilization and the problems of mass-mind arising out of this complexity. He says, "So the third and present phase in western civilization is this—how to reconcile the great scale industrialism of the present and the growth of the mass-mind with individual liberty. How is the individual to maintain and express his individuality in this vast machine in which he is but an insignificant cog or nut? . . . What faces us today is a great and increasing complexity of social relationships with corresponding perplexities in regard to group loyalties." (P. 356.)

Continuing to discuss the concept of progress a final definition is reached which says, "There are certain technical conditions of progress which, although they do not in themselves constitute genuine progress, may favor it. With respect to these alone man has, beyond dispute, advanced. I mean in the increase in his technical control over the forces of nature through the improvements in material machinery, intellectual machinery, and the machinery of economic organization and administration. . . . This improvement takes place in two ways: (1) The enrichment of the transmissible content of culture. (2) The improvement of the instruments for the transmission of the accumulated culture to the members of the coming generation." (P. 362.) The elements of progress presented are intellectual progress, moral progress, social freedom and equality, the last being defined in terms of democratic education as the key to social progress, the basic purpose of which is that all human beings may have the opportunity to live the richest and most harmonious lives their native and environmental endowments make possible for them.

The concepts of justice, political authority, man's relation to the state, and the development of the individual through a democracy, together with the discussion of the limitations of the democratic state, lead into the final discussion of the book which regards the social principles of the fundamental institutions of society, the family, education, and religion, as, after all, the all important relationship which make possible the most complete fulfillment of the individual in his relations to the social order.

The book is not elementary, but is one which will be greatly appreciated by those who have the sympathetic background to catch the scholarly development of the theme and receive the inspiration which the work as a whole has for the student.

H. L. PRITCHETT.

Southern Methodist University.

Pipkin, Charles W. *The Idea of Social Justice*. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927, pp. xx, 596.)

Any book which is so compact as to incorporate into about six hundred pages the results of investigations requiring close to two thousand notes in order to refer to original sources and to nearly five hundred secondary sources is a book which requires careful study rather than casual reading. Such a book is Professor Pipkin's *The Idea of Social Justice*; and, by the

same token, it richly deserves painstaking study. However, a single careful reading is sufficient to cause one or two definite impressions to formulate themselves. A first one is the impression of a stupendous effort which manifestly was made and had to be made in order that a highly ambitious task should be conscientiously and thoroughly performed. A second impression is that of lessons to be learned and of valuable truths to be gleaned. Such lessons and truths, it is to be suspected in retrospect, stand out because they are made to stand out by the writer. However, so subtle is the commentary that the reader is scarcely conscious of being guided; he feels no resentment at preaching, for there is none; he is principally aware of a firm faith, of a cheerful optimism, and of a philosophy which, without moralizing, is highly moral.

The task of the reviewer is made difficult or easy, depending on the point of view, by the presence in the book of two excellent introductions. The introductory chapter of the author, manifestly written after the book, as introductions are and should be, gives in outline the scope of what has just been said to be an ambitious task. Taking as the object of his study those two states whose governments and political activities are the most influential in the world, Great Britain and France, the writer seeks to discover and to abstract those forces in the social conditions of the two countries in the first quarter of the present century which have had as a resultant discernible movement. Thus, he attempts to make possible an understanding of social movement, or of the social movement, by a comprehensive study of such legislation as has had as its aim a more equitable position for all individuals amongst the good things of life, by a careful investigation of the at least equally important matter of institutions and activities of administration calculated to give reality to this aim, and by an endeavor to appraise the vital force, sometimes only the survival value of mistaken but sincere effort, furnished by the struggles of those who know from experience the blighting scourge of injustice and who yet have faith that unflagging work for the cause will render certain the advent of a better day. Finally, he believes that such attempts at understanding give to the idea of social justice, which Stephen Leacock terms an "unsolved riddle," a richer and a fuller meaning.

A second task of a reviewer is likewise performed in another introduction, written by W. G. S. Adams, Gladstone Professor of Political Theory and Institutions at Oxford University. Brief comment is made on the nature of social justice and on the development and enrichment of the idea and of the thing. Thus, with a few strokes a picture is sketched, and in it in proper perspective is seen Professor Pipkin's book. It is asserted to deserve welcome as the first comprehensive attempt of its kind. That the book is worthy of serious study has already been subscribed to here, and there remains only to say a word of a personal character. There is inspiration in the tone of the book. There is no indication but that the author, after an exhaustive study, has escaped the sour cynicism which only too easily results when, according to

the much quoted words of Bryce, one is obliged "to stand by when golden opportunities were being lost, to see the wrong thing done when it would have been easy to do the right thing." Like a golden thread there is seen running through the book the willingness and desire of the author, in spite of struggles and lost energy and bigotry and inhumanity and seeming futility, to subscribe to the conclusion of Bryce that "the world has nevertheless made some advances. . . ." The author believes that further advance can and will be made sufficient to give reality to the simple words of Aristotle, so far only the expression of an ideal, that the state "exists to make life good." The author's faith has remained firm and his ideals untarnished.

R. K. GOOCH,

University of Virginia.

Ram, V. Shiva. *Comparative Colonial Policy, with Special Reference to the American Colonial Policy* (being the Patna University Readership Lectures, 1925). Calcutta: Longmans, Green & Co., Ltd., 1926, pp. xx, 297.)

It is not often that the English-speaking world is vouchsafed an objective and scholarly appraisal of so controversial a subject as colonial administration. And when the appraiser is himself a native of one of the countries subjected to imperial control, the effort is all the more vital and praiseworthy. Not since the late Paul Reinsch ventured, a quarter of a century ago, into this field, has there been published in English as systematic and comprehensively critical a treatment of the achievements of the great colonial powers as is found in the volume under review. To his task Dr. Ram, who is Professor of Political Science at Lucknow University, devotes himself with prodigality, bringing to bear thereon the results of wide personal observation and the mature scholarship born of a British and American training.

After a penetrating initial discussion of the motives of colonization—religious, penal, missionary, Malthusian and commercial, including colonization for the maintenance of secure communications—Dr. Ram analyzes the colonial systems of Portugal, Spain, Holland, France, Britain, and the United States. Portugal's achievements he notes as having always been mediocre, due to a lack of a scientific theory of colonization, the low-grade character of administrators and their callousness to native needs. "The Portuguese could not maintain through cool and rational means of administration what they . . . gained by dash and the impetus of enthusiasm." (P. 32.) Of Spain his appraisal is that the failure of her empire was due to "centralized administration, utter lack of self-government, corrupt officials, avaricious greed for quick returns at the sacrifice of future prospects, a restrictive commercial system, trade monopoly, erroneous economic doctrines, the admission of the church to an exaggerated share in public affairs, and a general wastefulness of resources accompanied by enormous taxation"—a melancholy picture indeed. (P. 38.) To Holland Dr. Ram credits

a better record, believing that her colonial system has shown a much higher capacity of accommodation to native needs. He feels as to the East Indies, however, that "constitutional reforms . . . cannot be postponed much longer with a progressive India on one side and a democratic Philippines on the other." (P. 53.)

For the French system, which remains one of centralization and exploitation, the author has not, on the whole, any praise: "Generally speaking, it may be said that in the French colonial possessions very little regard has been shown for the interests of the native peoples." (P. 66.) Frenchmen have almost a monopoly of political power. Dr. Ram's strictures are particularly severe against the militarization of the native races in Asia and Africa, but he hints that this creates a two-edged weapon: "If by conscription the natives of Africa are trained to fight and are in the possession of weapons, France and the other powers may find, in course of time, that their subjects cannot any longer be exploited with impunity." (P. 72.)

Naturally the British empire bulks large in Dr. Ram's discussion. His survey of British expansionism, and especially of the creation of "the second empire" after the loss of the first in America, is particularly keen and he has affectively tied up the ideology of the different schools of thought in Nineteenth Century England to the practice of actual colonial administration, without neglecting the material factors conditioning British imperialism. In reviewing recent aspects of British colonial policy, particularly as regards India, the author does not mince words in making clear his view that "England cannot afford to allow any of the real power in Indian affairs to pass out of the hands of the British military and civilian officials, as this would mean the end of European expansion in Asia and of the economic imperialism upon which the prosperity of Great Britain is believed by the imperialists to rest." (P. 139.) It is Dr. Ram's belief that "if the inhabitants of the colonies had their way, they would undoubtedly in almost every case put an end to the domination of the alien ruling power." (P. 140.)

Coming to the United States, Dr. Ram deftly sketches the phases of American expansion and economic imperialism and gives an admirable detailed account of American administration in the Philippines which, as a system, "stands midway between the irresponsible American system and the responsible English system." The author finds much of the machinery set up for the Philippines under the Jones Act an admirable pattern upon which England should model in dealing with India, but regrets the retrogressive character of the Wood-Coolidge administration. In a word, "expectant Asia, which houses and feeds one-half of the human race, is watching to see whether America will put into operation her twin principles of 'the consent of the governed' and 'self-determination.'" (P. vii.)

The volume closes—as was impossible for its pre-war predecessors—with a review of the measures undertaken under the mandate system to enforce internationally the principle of trusteeship in the relations between advanced and backward races. Admitting the existing deficien-

cies, of both jurisdiction and procedure, under League supervision in its present form, Dr. Ram nevertheless pins his faith on the Permanent Mandates Commission "in the hope that by their timely and statesman-like policy, they may be able to avert the conflict of color and the disaster of a possible world war between European and non-European races." In this view Lord Olivier, who contributes an illuminating foreword of sponsorship, concurs.

All in all, this stimulating work of a distinguished scholar, with its select bibliography and its comprehensive index, should be a welcome addition to the equipment of all social scientists interested in the problems of government and race adjustment.

MALBONE W. GRAHAM, JR.

University of California at Los Angeles.

Mecham, J. Lloyd. *Francisco de Ibarra and Nueva Vizcaya*. (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1927, pp. ix. 265.)

Professor Mecham's book is one of a series of studies now appearing that deal with the extension of Spanish influence into the region north of Mexico. It summarizes the life-work of Francisco de Ibarra, distinguished conqueror and colonizer of Nueva Vizcaya. Ibarra was the scion of a noble family from Vizcaya in Old Spain. In the New World this was of significance. It was the stepping stone to opportunity. His wealthy uncle Diego, the son-in-law of Viceroy Velasco, supported him in all his activities. With such backing he early gained notable political advancement.

Mr. Mecham's book is divided into nine chapters, five of which deal primarily with the activities of Francisco de Ibarra. The first two chapters are introductory, presenting a running account of the territory and people included in Nueva Vizcaya and of the political development of Nueva Galicia from the fall of Mexico City in 1521 to the beginning of Ibarra's work in 1554. Then follows the body of the work. Here we find chronicled the activities of Ibarra from 1554 to 1562, in which period the rich mining region northwest of Zacatecas was opened. The settlement of San Martín, Aviño, Nombre de Diós and other mining camps vies for space with the political development of the region and tedious accounts of missionary activity. It would possibly have been more effective to have made a further division of this chapter.

Next we have the story of Ibarra's appointment in 1562 as governor and captain-general of a new province, Nueva Vizcaya. He at once asserted his authority over its scattered mining settlements, formally established his rule, and then set out to explore. He was seeking Copalá and Tópia, said to be fabulously rich kingdoms. Tópia was found in the heart of the mountains, but no treasure. Ibarra now proceeded to Culiacán on the coast, explored the unconquered region to the north thereof, founded a settlement on the Fuerte called San Juan, and then turned south below Culiacán and settled Chiametla. Meanwhile the Governor was anxious to explore the limitless and inviting territory in the far north, and in 1565 set out on the greatest of his explorations.

He ascended as far as the upper Yaqui valley and was then led eastward to Casas Grandes in Chihuahua. It seems unlikely that he reached any of the pueblos along the Gila in Arizona. From this extensive seven months' tour Ibarra realized that he must seek for treasures elsewhere than in the distant north. Accordingly we find his lieutenants opening mines at Indé, Santa Bárbara and other points. At the same time Ibarra, now failing in health, became engaged in a bitter contest over jurisdiction with the Audiencia of Nueva Galicia which was not concluded till long after his death. The Audiencia felt that Ibarra had seized territory which properly belonged to it.

The two final chapters deal with the farming, grazing and mining activities of Nueva Vizcaya, Ibarra's last days and a brief summary of the status of the settlements in the province at the time of his death in 1575. The youthful conqueror was then only 36 years of age.

Professor Mecham has produced a notable book of sound scholarship that will be welcomed by students of Southwestern history. It is neatly printed and typographical errors are few. Some mistakes have been noted. For example the expression "Seven Cities of Cibola" is incorrectly used (p. 24); the reference to "the expedition of Antonio de Espejo to New Mexico in 1584" (p. 111) is evidently not what the author means; the use of the word "hung" (p. 117) is not correct.

The book has two maps, a good bibliography and index. Much new material has been assembled and utilized. It is, however, aggravating to find that in the footnotes Obregón's *Crónica* is constantly referred to with neither chapter nor page citations, although the book was published in 1924.*

GEORGE P. HAMMOND.

University of Arizona.

Ritter, William E. *The Natural History of Our Conduct*. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1927, pp. x. 339.)

Undaunted by the many difficulties besetting his path, the author of *The Natural History of Our Conduct* boldly sets forth to find an explanation of human behavior, not limiting his considerations to simple, reflex acts, but including the most complicated, intelligent and far-sighted behavior of which man is capable. He seeks his answer not among men but among the lower animals. In the attempt to apply the method of the comparative anatomist to the study of conduct he goes farther than any of his predecessors.

Apparently he anticipates much objection to this method, for he spends many words in its defense. Several chapters in the beginning of the book are devoted to a rehearsal of the evidence for organic evolution and its corollary, namely, that men and animals have a common origin.

*EDITOR'S NOTE.—The copy of Obregón's *Crónicas* used for the preparation of this study was the original manuscript in the Archivo de Indias, therefore the impossibility of giving page citations. The "book" referred to by Dr. Hammond was not consulted because of textual errors.

The argument goes even deeper and presents a defense of the validity of the kind of evidence offered. After this preliminary rebuttal the author asks us to accept the assumption that the behavior tendencies of men and animals, even as their physical equipment, originated from common ancestry and that, therefore, the study of animal behavior will throw light on human behavior, even as the study of animal structure aids an understanding of human structure.

At first thought the assumption seems modest and reasonable. And what a field it opens up. No longer need we depend upon the uncertain speculations of philosophy or the somewhat less uncertain but painfully slow advance of experimentation. We have only to examine in detail the varied activities of the teeming animal world about us to discover exactly what we ourselves are like. But on second thought the assumption seems less tenable. The similarities of human and animal anatomy do not appear to be duplicated in any but the simplest forms of behavior. Men and monkeys do not act as much alike as they look. Even within the human species the range of behavior differences, if a comparison be possible, far exceeds the range of anatomical differences. Nothing observable in the physical makeup of the genius enables us to distinguish him from the ordinary individual or, in many cases, from the idiot. Does a study of low-grade mentality reveal to us an understanding of genius? Probably not. Nor is it likely that we shall learn much about intelligent human behavior from an investigation of the cunning web of the oriole's nest or the remarkable engineering feats of the beaver. Even the most wonderful of animal activities fall so far short of being human that to measure the two on the same scale is utterly impossible. The author meets this difficulty by establishing a life-or-death criterion for judging the degree of intelligence manifested. That individual which displays the greatest adaptability, as shown by long life for itself and its species, is the most intelligent. This test obviously favors the lower animals. Judged by it the activities of men in war, in which many men are inevitably killed, must perforce be quite as unintelligent as and, hence, on a par with, the attempt of a herd of buffaloes to cross a deep river on thin ice. A man who deliberately limits the size of his family is as unintelligent as the mud-dauber which inadvertently fails to provide food for its young before sealing up the nest. In both cases the behavior is maladaptive and, therefore, unintelligent. Presumably most artistic efforts of men must be classed as maladaptive, since it can scarcely be maintained that they lengthen life or increase the number of individuals in the species.

Such a leveling down of human behavior in order to make it comparable with that of animals cannot possibly help us to understand it. If the value of Dr. Ritter's book be assumed to depend upon the extent of its contribution to our knowledge of human behavior, it cannot be rated high. However, as a description of animal activities, the book has some excellent qualities. It is both instructive and interesting. It shows on part of the author careful observation and a wide knowledge of the behavior of the lower animals. His cautious avoidance of anthropomorphism gives to his descriptions the ring of truth. The reader feels

that he has before him a faithful and impartial record. How much better it would have been if the first chapters had been omitted and the book allowed to stand for the best that is in it, a delightful account of the ways of wild life.

CARL M. ROSENQUIST.

University of Texas.

Hoag, Clarence G. and Hallett, George H. *Proportional Representation*. (New York: Macmillan, 1926, pp. xx, 546.)

The problem of adequate and satisfactory representation of the people in their Legislature will never be solved by the employment of any device, yet all admit that the prevailing system now used is deplorably disappointing. Popular sovereignty, the will of the majority, our electoral heritage from England, and political sophisms have filled the mind of the public with fantastic dreams on lawmaking, yet the fundamental question of reflecting faithfully the will of the people has not been honestly and seriously answered. Obviously representation is the heart and core of popular governments. What we have called representative government is representative only by courtesy, for how can the Legislature, the branch that should really express the will of the people, perform its function when some other branch is perpetually checking and balancing it? Or how can the Legislature be said to be representative when even the majority is not truly represented?

Various voting devices have been used and for various purposes. The single-member district system of voting is a failure, and so is the general ticket or block system, for each defeats its purposes in sending to the Legislature those whom the majority in a given area really prefer. Strange as it may seem, the majority is dependent on the minority when the real test comes in a representative assembly, for whatever majority there appears must necessarily be composed not only of the preponderant party but of the various minorities as well.

Minority representation, then, is essential to the crystallization of public opinion in popular governments. Several systems of minority representation have been proposed and used. The limited vote, the single non-transferable vote, the cumulative vote, the schedule system, the proxy system, the list systems, and the single transferable vote or the Hare system have been advocated as proper modes of expressing accurately the choices of delegates to popular assemblies. The list and the Hare system are the only really commendable schemes that have been in successful operation, and the latter is the preference of Messrs. Hoag and Hallett, the authors of *Proportional Representation*. They have had extensive experience in the practical application of the Hare system and in observing its results in different parts of the world.

The book is designed as a working manual. The explanations and directions are comprehensive and clear, yet it will require close application on the part of the reader, for there are many technicalities in this

treatise which, though not difficult to understand, must be thoroughly mastered to be appreciated.

The authors do not content themselves with explaining the advantages of proportional representation, but courageously face every hostile criticism that has been urged against the system. Some of the desirable results attained by proportional representation are the destruction of Gerrymandering, for all votes in a district will count no matter how it is divided; check on machine rule, removal of direct action in government, for a dependable leadership will be developed and minorities will be represented on important legislative committees; abolition of the primary, and better feeling generally during the campaign. The authors' refutation of the objections to the Hare system is quite thorough and convincing. The only serious reservation that the voter can make is the cost; yet if he gets what he wants, why should two or three cents a vote embarrass him or restrain him from adopting proportional representation? The single legal question of its constitutionality should no longer cause alarm, even though it be necessary to provide for it in State Constitutions, as Oregon has done; the Supreme Court of Ohio has declared it constitutional for home rule cities, though this is opposed by decisions in California and Michigan.

This is a valuable book in many respects, and it has so many meritorious features that it seems to be presumptuous for a reviewer to offer any but favorable criticism. Nevertheless, it does appear to the reader to be a break in the unity of the discourse to place in the Appendix, which is as extensive as the regular part, material that not only properly belongs in the main discussion but is continuously and consecutively paragraphed-numbered. Appendices III-X could easily be made into chapters, and it is of doubtful propriety to give any space at all to "Quotations"; Appendix I could be placed near other statistical data.

The theory of proportional representation is attractive, and it seems to be the best solution to our much vexed problem of majority rule. This system is eminently adapted to the manager plan of municipal government, and in multi-member legislative districts it should give satisfaction. It may even be applied in congressional elections. Its limitations, of course, will be found in electing officers who have dual functions, such as commissioners who determine policy and also act as head of some administrative office.

H. H. GUICE.

Southern Methodist University.

Beck, James M. *The Vanishing Rights of the States*. (New York: George H. Doran Co., 1926, pp. 132.)

The author of this brochure once again assumes his now familiar rôle as defender of the Constitution, this time endeavoring to expose the dangers to our constitutional foundations involved in acknowledging an unrestricted right of the Senate to determine with finality the qualifications of its members. While he is evidently deeply agitated over the ever-increasing submergence of the states in our constitutional system,

Mr. Beck is especially alarmed at the prospect of the Constitution, in respect to those of its provisions which relate to the election of Senators, being subverted by the temporary excesses of party strife. His discussion of the subject is apropos the recent elections to the Senate of William S. Vare, of Pennsylvania, and Frank L. Smith, of Illinois, and the question that has arisen as to "whether these states had the right to make such elections, or whether the Senate of the United States has the right to sit in judgment upon their deliberate choice."

In a brief but illuminating historical review of the problem, the author recapitulates the numerous precedents, foreign and domestic, opposed to the assumption of such power by a representative assembly. He disinters the long-buried case of John Wilkes whose successful struggle against George III for admittance into the House of Commons established the right of Englishmen to be represented in Parliament by delegates of their own choice. Between this contest, generally regarded a notable constitutional landmark of the Eighteenth Century, and the present controversy Mr. Beck observes a close affinity, the only essential difference being that "in the case of Wilkes the fate of a scurrilous radical was involved."

The author examines in no little detail the pertinent provisions of the Constitution, not only analyzing each intrinsically but also surveying its historical significance in the light of judicial as well as legislative interpretation. His conclusion is that each state has the right to select from its inhabitants any individual to represent it in the Senate that it sees fit, irrespective of his intellectual or moral qualifications, subject only to the limitations that he shall be 30 years of age, a citizen of the United States for at least nine years, an inhabitant of the State, and not a holder of any office under the United States.

Mr. Beck, attaching great significance to the juxtaposition in the Constitution of the clauses relating to the Senate's power of expulsion and its authority to "punish its members for disorderly behavior," concedes the right of the Senate to expel a member as a disciplinary measure for misconduct subsequent to his election. He insists, however, that the historical background of the Constitution admits of no doubt that the Senate is not competent to go back of an election in order to pass upon a Senator's previous conduct, either moral or otherwise. What he may have done in the primary at which he was nominated or before it is to be passed upon by the people of his state, such conduct being, in a political sense, *res adjudicata*.

The greatest concession the author is willing to make is that congressional legislation regulatory of senatorial primaries would *probably* be constitutionally admissible. But, he contends, to allow the Senate, by a general rule or a resolution in the Pennsylvania and Illinois cases, to unseat any Senator-elect would be a palpable arrogation of authority which the Senate can properly exercise only in conjunction with the House of Representatives and the President.

The author's treatment of this somewhat perplexing constitutional problem, brought forcibly to the forefront of current political discussion

by the exigencies of contemporary politics, is timely and not altogether without value. The only too obvious popular vein in which it is cast, however, renders it disappointing to the serious student whose appetite for scholarly enlightenment on a knotty constitutional point is not so easily appeased.

CAMPBELL B. BEARD.

University of Texas.

Buck, A. E., and collaborators. *Municipal Finance*. (New York: Macmillan, 1926, pp. vii, 562.)

The technic of municipal administration has improved greatly in the past fifteen years, but publicity of the new methodology of administration has not kept pace with technical developments. There has been a dearth of secondary material, written in a readable style, summarizing the chief discoveries. Very little has been done in a popular manner, and the result is that the achievements of the researchers has remained esoteric knowledge. This book performs a useful and desirable function in presenting an outline of the newer administrative methods in a manner for the most part understandable by the amateur.

The authors of the book, Mr. A. E. Buck, Mr. William Watson, Mr. Edward M. Martin, Mr. Phillip H. Cornick, and Mr. Luther Gulick, have all been working in various phases of municipal administration for a number of years, and some of these men were pioneers in the field. They are therefore unusually fitted for recording what has taken place. Mr. Buck is responsible for chapters on the significance of municipal finance, on the organization of financial administration, on the budget and budget-making, on employment and pensions, on purchasing and on financing municipally-owned utilities. Along with Mr. Watson, Mr. Buck wrote the chapters on budgetary and auditing control, and on cost accounting, and along with Mr. Martin the chapter on graphic statistics in municipal finance. Mr. Watson is responsible for the chapter on general accounting and reporting. Mr. Cornick for the chapters on assessment of property for taxation and special assessments, and Mr. Gulick for the chapter on debt administration. Mr. Cornick and Mr. Watson wrote the chapter on treasury management, and Mr. Cornick and Mr. Gulick the chapter on miscellaneous city revenues.

This recital of chapter headings indicates the range of the subject matter. The material covered is almost too broad for adequate treatment in a volume of 550 pages, and some of the phases of municipal finance were necessarily skimmed. This is true for the sections on accounting where an understanding of the treatment involves a close acquaintance with municipal accounting. However, the presentation is uniformly clear and well written and is for the most part not beyond the capacity of a college junior or an intelligent department head. The more technical chapters will probably be read by men who have some background, and who need orientation, and this is admirably supplied

by this book. The chapters on graphs, debt administration, budgetary control and special assessments are unusually clear.

The book should have a wide reading among city officials. It should also help the instructors in universities who have been wrestling with the textbook problem in courses in municipal administration.

Mr. Buck, who is responsible for most of the chapters and for the general editorial work, is to be most highly congratulated on putting forth a book which is not only serviceable, but which will probably be a contribution to the permanent literature on the subject of administration.

HARRY BARTH.

University of Oklahoma.

Newbingin, Marion L. *Canada*. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1926, pp. xvi. 308.)

The title of this book is somewhat misleading. On the basis of content, the book should have been called *The Historical Geography of French Canada*; for the entire volume with the exception of an epilogue of thirteen pages is devoted to the French period, the narrative being brought forward only to 1763.

The author does not pretend to have discovered any new material or even to have used all of the old in order to justify his publication. His sole purpose is "to retell the early story of the St. Lawrence area, that is, of French Canada, from a somewhat unfamiliar standpoint"; and "that somewhat unfamiliar standpoint" is that of the geographer. And who would have been better qualified for this task than the distinguished editor of *The Scottish Geographical Review* himself?

No one interested in a general way in the problem of the relations between geography and history need go elsewhere for his information. Almost every page abounds with illustrations of "the interactions between man and place." So Cartier is significant because he showed "that not only was the Gulf proper (St. Lawrence) easy to navigate, but that the lower part of the river itself could be reached without difficulty, and that here in addition to the fisheries in the strict sense, whales, walruses and seals were abundant." The successful establishment of Quebec proved, as the author points out, that settlement in this lower valley was possible. The establishment of Montreal marked the final stage in that settlement, but at the same time "symbolized the hope of a new advance into the almost limitless spaces beyond." Geography made that advance certain, for, "the St. Lawrence lowlands are but a part of the great expanse of fertile plain country which, beyond the Great Lakes, extends westwards through the Mississippi Basin and southwards to the shores of the Gulf of Mexico." The approaches to the Great Lakes and the Mississippi River from the St. Lawrence were relatively easy and were made known by Champlain, Radisson and Groseilliers.

This rapid expansion, this establishment of a vast empire, held together by only a few widely scattered settlements while the English

colonies were being consolidated between the Appalachian highlands and the sea proved to be the primary cause of Canada's downfall. But physiography made such expansion essential.

If there had been no rapids on the upper St. Lawrence; if there had been no barren strip where the present beautiful tourist resort of the Thousand Islands lies; if there had been no rugged plateau between the Ottawa Valley and Georgian Bay; then Canada might have expanded slowly and continuously from Montreal to the plains of the Mississippi, and gathered strength to keep the English out. If even the Canadians had confined themselves to their own valley strip and consolidated their position there, instead of advancing into an area too extensive for effective occupation, the future might have been different. *But they had no real choice.*

The founding of the Hudson Bay Company menaced the fur trade of Canada from the north as did the unfriendly Iroquois in control of the Hudson—Mohawk Valley in alliance with the English from the south and east. "Canadian enterprise was thus forced to find an outlet to the southwest."

There are several excellent chapters on Frontenau's administration and the politico-geographic significance of Arcadia. The fifteen maps which the volume contains are so small and generally so poorly prepared as to be of little value. There are in addition sixteen illustrations and a bibliography. The book is readable and convincing, and, because of the emphasis placed upon the geographic factor, is a real contribution to the historical literature of Canada.

MILTON R. GUTSCH.

University of Texas.

Noyes, Alexander D. *The War Period of American Finance*. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1926, pp. x, 459.)

In his *Thirty Years of American Finance*, which was published in 1898, Mr. Noyes treated in a way which has made the book classical the period from 1865 to 1897; in his *Forty Years of American Finance* he added chapters to his first work which covered the ten years following 1897; but so numerous and extraordinary are the events of the years 1908-1925 that the present volume is restricted to this period.

As the passage of time draws us farther away from the years of the Great War the intense interest and the thrill which the economic events then excited in us from day to day grow dimmer in memory, but a book like Mr. Noyes' recalls them to us with some of their old gripping, dramatic quality. The closing of the stock exchanges and the crises in agriculture, commerce, and in business life generally which immediately followed the fateful July 31, 1914; the general prosperity of the latter part of 1915 and 1916; the stupendous performances of this country in Government finance and in the mobilization of industry which took place after our entry into the war; the temporary industrial reaction which occurred at the close of the war; the abnormal boom of

1919 and the crisis of 1920, receive that treatment by Mr. Noyes which is to be expected from one who, as does he, commands the facts and combines with a skilled and mature appreciation of the relative importance of his data the ability to weave them into a most readable story. The book is incidentally a useful reference for statistics as to exports and imports of merchandise, gold movements, discount rates, bond sales, foreign exchange rates, price changes, and the like.

Inasmuch as Mr. Noyes' windows figuratively look out upon Wall Street, of particular interest is his opinion of the banking legislation of the Wilson administration. He dismisses curtly the so-called Money Trust Investigation of 1913, but he gives high praise to President Wilson and Carter Glass for their work in connection with the formulation and passage of the Federal Reserve Act. Especially interesting is his view that it is unlikely that there would have been enacted in 1913 a banking and currency-reform measure if either Mr. Taft or Mr. Roosevelt had been President.

Mr. Noyes is the dean, as well as the ablest, of American financial writers. He is not a prolific book producer, but when he writes one it is good. Those interested in American economic and financial history will find his latest book to be the most adequate extant treatment of the financial aspects of what are probably the most extraordinary years in American financial history since the American Revolution.

E. T. MILLER.

University of Texas.

King, F. H. *Farmers of Forty Centuries*. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1927, pp. 370.)

It is a novel experience to find an American writer expressing the opinion that the old civilizations of the Orient may have much to teach the Western Nations of efficiency. Mr. King's travels through China, Korea, and Japan have imbued in him an envious enthusiasm for the incredibly intensive agriculture practiced there. His intimate acquaintance with the customs of Eastern farmers and the technique they have developed in their age-long struggle for food, reveals a phase of Oriental life and culture too little known to the Western World. The amazingly efficient devices for husbanding their limited resources, with the spectre of starvation hounding their footsteps, should be a matter of common knowledge to us. If it were we might develop a larger tolerance for the so-called backward races, a greater appreciation of our own favored situation, and a more intelligent program for using our resources that we may never be driven by the same goad.

One may deplore Mr. King's assumption that pressure of population will ultimately necessitate such frugal living in the United States; and that an agrarian technique which allows of no luxury nor leisure is, or ever could be, desirable, though it might produce ever so great a quantity of food per acre. However, the reader must keep in mind

that Mr. King is an expert soil technologist. He is interested in methods and devices for maintaining and increasing the fertility of land. Here in the Orient he finds an ancient agricultural system which does that very thing most marvelously. As a result he fails to appreciate the economic and social significance of the situation.

R. H. MONTGOMERY.

University of Texas.

Nathan, Maud. *The Story of an Epoch-Making Movement*. (New York: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1926, pp. xx, 245.)

Mrs. Nathan makes available in this small volume an account of the development, aims and achievements of the Consumers' League. The League is an organization of socially-minded individuals who have worked steadfastly to eliminate certain deplorable conditions surrounding the employment of women, young girls and children in mercantile establishments, sweat shops, laundries, factories, etc. Its leaders are animated by the belief that "the consumer has a wonderful opportunity to improve human relations in industry," and that "consumers should be encouraged to throw their weight and power constantly on the side of justice and fairness." To shorten the hours, raise the wages, and improve the working conditions of those groups of laborers among whom trade unionism has proved largely ineffective, the League relies on the force of an educated public opinion and its ability to direct the patronage of its membership and sympathizers. According to Mrs. Nathan's account no small measure of success has attended the work of the League, but much remains yet to be done.

Mrs. Nathan has written an interesting and timely history of a movement of which, one fears, too little is known in the Southwest. There are brief forewords by the Hon. Newton D. Baker, Mary Anderson, and Edward A. Filene.

E. E. HALE.

University of Texas.